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PANOPTICISM FOR POLICE: STRUCTURAL REFORM 
BARGAINING AND POLICE REGULATION BY DATA-DRIVEN 
SURVEILLANCE 
Mary D. Fan 
Abstract: Spurred by civil rights investigations, police departments across the nation, 
including in Washington State, are engaging in structural reform bargaining and collaborative 
design of institutional reforms. Often before any complaint is filed in court or a judge makes 
any findings of unconstitutionality, police—and the groups threatening to sue the police—are 
cooperating to fashion remedies for the biggest concerns that have shadowed the law of 
criminal procedure, such as excessive force and the disproportionate targeting of people of 
color. Prominent scholars have expressed concern over settlement of civil rights suits outside 
the arena of the courtroom and without legal clarification. This Article argues, however, that 
bargaining in the shadow of law and outside the courthouse may yield smarter and farther-
reaching reforms and remedies based on data-driven surveillance than could be achieved 
through litigation and judicial decision. 
This Article argues that the remedies being fashioned “off the books”—that is, outside 
the doctrine in the case law reporters—offer important insights for the future of police 
governance and reform. The primary engine of police regulation—the exclusionary rule, 
which deters rights violations through the remedy of exclusion of improperly obtained 
evidence—is increasingly eroding and becoming the last resort rather than first instinct. The 
question becomes: what regulatory and remedial model should arise to fill the vacuum? The 
Article contends that a promising paradigm being refined by structural reform bargaining is 
regulation by data-driven surveillance—what this Article dubs “panopticism for police.” 
Panopticism is efficient internalized regulation by surveillance. The term comes from the 
metaphor of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, in which prisoners in a state of perfect visibility 
positioned around an opaque watch tower self-regulate because at any time the guard may be 
watching. The goal of police panopticism is leveraging data-driven surveillance from 
multiple institutional vantages. The state of “conscious and permanent visibility” reduces 
monitoring and remedial costs and triggers self-regulation and institutional culture change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
New Jersey police supervisors review on a random-selection basis 
videos of traffic stops and require officers to report the race of people 
stopped and searched pursuant to a consent decree.1 Los Angeles police 
are required by consent decree to complete a written or electronic report 
for each incident where force was used and for each investigative stop 
documenting the subject’s “apparent race, ethnicity, or national origin,” 
the reason for the stop, and whether a search was conducted.2 Stratified 
random samples of the reports are regularly audited through a procedure 
that includes “an examination for ‘canned’ language, inconsistent 
information, lack of articulation of the legal basis for the applicable 
action” or other reporting problems.3 Wallkill, New York, police are 
now obliged by consent decree to “document their activities while on 
duty and in a form that will allow monitoring of such activities to take 
place” through methods such as a daily log and documentation of stops.4 
Detroit police are overseen by a monitor to ensure implementation of a 
consent judgment that, among other things, establishes a risk 
management database to track officer conduct and requires setting 
thresholds for red flags that trigger supervisory review to detect 
                                                     
1. Consent Decree at paras. 29, 32, 36–37, United States v. New Jersey, No. Civil 99-5970 
(MLC) (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1999).  
2. Consent Decree at paras. 55–69, 104–05, United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. Civil 00-
11769 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001). 
3. Id. at para. 128. 
4. Consent Decree at paras. 10–13, New York v. Wallkill, No. 01-Civ-0364 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 
2001). 
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potentially problematic officers.5 
These are just a few examples of institutional reform of police 
practices in recent decades.6 Before instituting reforms, these 
jurisdictions and others in similar straits struggled with allegations such 
as excessive force, harassment, and disproportionate targeting of 
minorities by the police.7 Civil rights investigations and, in some cases, 
lawsuits followed.8 Changes ultimately were not wrought by judicial 
mandate.9 Constitutional criminal procedure doctrine—customarily 
                                                     
5. Consent Judgment, Use of Force and Arrest and Witness Detention at paras. 78–90, 124–30, 
United States v. City of Detroit, No. 03-72258 (E.D. Mich. June 12, 2003).  
6. There are many other similar examples. For example, New York City police report the race of 
people targeted for investigative stops and promulgate written policies forbidding profiling pursuant 
to a stipulation to settle a civil rights suit. Stipulation of Settlement at 5, 8–9, ex. B, Daniels v. City 
of New York, No. 99 Civ. 1695 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2003). Montgomery County, Maryland, 
police have agreed to implement a computer system recording traffic stop data, including race of 
people stopped and searched, to conduct regular data analyses, and to release the results in semi-
annual public reports. Memorandum of Agreement Between the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Montgomery 
County, Md., the Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of Police and the Fraternal Order of Policy, 
Montgomery Cnty. Lodge, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc., 11–12 (Jan. 14, 2000). Pittsburgh 
police must file a written report after each traffic stop that records the race of people stopped, 
whether the stop escalated to a search, and whether searches yielded any contraband or other 
evidence pursuant to a consent decree. Consent Decree at para. 16, United States v. Pittsburgh, No. 
Civil 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2002). Virgin Islands police must document all uses of force in 
writing and develop a computerized risk management system that enables audits of such factors as 
each officer’s uses of force and decisions to charge subjects with “resisting arrest,” “assault on a 
police officer,” “disorderly conduct,” or “obstruction of official business” in use-of-force cases. 
Consent Decree at paras. 32, 59–60, United States v. Territory of the Virgin Islands, No. 03-23-09 
(D.V.I. Mar. 23, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/VIPD_CD_03-
23-09.pdf. 
7. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Police Predators, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2001, at A23 (describing 
numerous reports of police abuse of power in Wallkill, New York); Letter from Loretta King, 
Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., to Sheriff Joseph Arpaio, 
Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Office (Mar. 10, 2009) (conveying allegations and notifying regarding 
investigation); Letter from Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Civil Rights Div., to James K. Hahn, City Attorney, City of L.A. (May 8, 2000) (detailing 
allegations and findings); Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Civil Rights Div., to Jacquelyn Morrow, City Solicitor, City of Pittsburgh, City of 
Pittsburgh Investigative Findings Letter (date not specified), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/pittspdfind.php (detailing civil rights violations). 
8. See, e.g., Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (certifying class 
action in civil rights suit); Complaint at 1–7, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (W.D. 
Pa. Feb. 26, 1997) (launching civil rights suit). 
9. See, e.g., Joint Motion to Remove Case to the Inactive Docket and Stay Proceedings, United 
States v. Maricopa County, Ariz., No. 2:10-cv-01878-GMS (D. Ariz. June 2, 2011) (staying civil 
rights suit because of agreement to settle suit); Decision and Order Dismissing Defendant’s 
Challenge to Subject Matter Jurisdiction, New York v. Wallkill, No. 01-civ-0364 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
16, 2001), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-NY-0003-0006.pdf 
(finding subject-matter jurisdiction to enter proposed consent decree). 
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perceived as the main code of conduct regulating police10—did not grow 
new branches to prescribe reform. Claims concerning the need to check 
the police were not filtered through the distorting lens of a criminal case 
with a defendant seeking to exclude evidence from the jury. Rather, the 
reforms stemmed from structural reform bargaining between litigants 
outside the courthouse that produced consent decrees—negotiated 
agreements between parties in the form of a court order stipulated 
between the parties11—or memoranda of agreement—less formal 
agreements that typically provide for judicial enforcement in the event of 
a breach.12 
These negotiated reforms typically came in advance of any judicial 
involvement or finding of unconstitutionality.13 This distinction is 
important because some of the most famous and controversial forms of 
negotiated reforms—consent decrees—have frequently come after 
judicial findings of constitutional violations or probable violations, 
forcing the adoption of reforms.14 Such controversial consent decrees, 
familiar from contexts such as school desegregation, social services 
provision, and prison reform litigation, are sometimes decried as 
undemocratic because they embroil courts in dictating change and 
setting policies in areas that courts are ill-equipped to investigate and 
supervise.15 In contrast, this Article is focused on cooperative bargaining 
that leads to reform forged by police departments and civil rights 
                                                     
10. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two 
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2470 (1996) (explaining that constitutional 
criminal procedure doctrine is akin to criminal law for cops, prescribing police conduct rules).  
11. A consent decree is akin to a contract in that it binds the parties, but it is “more than a mere 
contract” because it is in form an order of the court and requires court action for consummation. 
Recent Cases, 41 HARV. L. REV. 538, 539 (1928).  
12. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States & the City of Villa Rica, 
Ga. 7 para. 4 (Dec. 23, 2003) (“This Agreement is enforceable through specific performance in 
Federal Court.”); Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States & the Village of Mt. 
Prospect, Ill. para. 43 (Jan. 22, 2003) (“This Agreement is enforceable through an action for specific 
performance in federal court.”). 
13. See, e.g., Consent Decree paras. 1, 4–8, United States v. New Jersey, Civil No. 99-5970 
(MLC) (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1999) (stating that the City denies the Justice Department’s allegations of 
unconstitutional practices but has agreed to the reforms specified in the consent decree to avoid “the 
risks and burdens of litigation”); Consent Decree paras. 1, 4, United States v. Pittsburgh, Civil No. 
97-0354 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997) (similar).  
14. See, e.g., ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS 
WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 9–12, 153–61 (2003) (accusing courts of becoming embroiled 
in problems they are ill-equipped to solve, offering examples where courts found violations or 
issued preliminary injunctions based on probable violations, leading to judicially enforceable 
consent decrees to remedy the violations). 
15. See id. 
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organizations in advance of any judicial findings of unconstitutionality, 
without the prodding and intervention of judicial legal interpretation. 
Such structural reform bargaining typically results in memoranda of 
agreement prefaced with the sweetener of praise for the police 
department’s cooperation in seeking solutions to alleged problems, 
though more formal consent decrees also occur.16 
This Article begins with the insight that the real engine of police 
reform increasingly is not found in the formal criminal procedure 
doctrine. The exclusionary rule—oft-described as the principal remedy 
and basis for deterring police misconduct17—is slipping as the main 
lever of police deterrence despite its starring role in criminal procedure 
jurisprudence.18 Civil rights suits against the police are no longer the 
chimerical alternative for redressing undesirable police practices.19 The 
most important actor for prescribing rules regulating police practices is 
shifting from the judiciary, clumsily wielding constitutional doctrine to 
manage the police, to politically attuned agencies and civil society.20 
                                                     
16. See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States & Jerry L. Demings, Orange County Sheriff 
paras. 5, 9 (Sept. 16, 2010) (praising Sheriff for his cooperation); Memorandum of Agreement 
Between the U.S. Dep’t of Justice & the City of Buffalo, N.Y. & the Buffalo Police Dep’t, the 
Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc., & the Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps. Local 264, at 
paras. 2, 4 (Sept. 19, 2002) (thanking the city and police department for cooperation with the aim of 
providing the “best police service” and providing a “model for the best police practices” in the use 
of chemical spray); cf. Consent Decree Between the U.S. Dep’t of Justice and Prince George’s 
County, Md. & the Prince George’s Cnty. Police Dep’t paras. 3, 6 (Jan. 24, 2004) (stating that the 
department denied allegations of unconstitutionality but entered into the agreement to avoid the 
burdens of litigation and “to partner in support of vigorous and constitutional law enforcement” 
using “the best available policing practices and procedures”).  
17. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 695, 707 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (describing the exclusionary rule as “often the only remedy effective to redress a Fourth 
Amendment violation”); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
MINN. L. REV. 349, 360 (1974) (explaining that the exclusionary rule is the “primary instrument for 
enforcing the fourth amendment”); Susan A. Bandes, And All the Pieces Matter: Thoughts on The 
Wire and the Criminal Justice System, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 435, 441 (2011) (describing the 
exclusionary rule as the “main remedy for police illegality”). 
18. See, e.g., Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698, 704 (holding that costs of exclusion are too high to 
remedy negligent police error causing erroneous arrest and search); David B. Owens, Comment, 
Fourth Amendment Remedial Equilibrium: A Comment on Herring v. United States and Pearson v. 
Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 563, 565–70 (2010) (discussing cutbacks on exclusionary remedy). 
19. See, e.g., Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development 
and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1388 
(1983) (explaining “the most ‘powerful’ remedies, criminal prosecutions for willful violation of the 
fourth amendment and actions for injunctions against large-scale violations, are rarely brought and 
rarely succeed” and “damage actions are also expensive, time-consuming, not readily available, and 
rarely successful”). 
20. See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1737–41 (2005) 
(analyzing the turn to judicial regulation to check police discretion); cf. Eric Miller, Putting the 
Practice into Theory, OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 31, 31 (2009) (arguing that criminal justice “law and 
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Nonjudicial actors, including prominently the United States Department 
of Justice and civil rights organizations, are collaboratively crafting 
remedial and governance regimes in the shadow of law and police 
department investigations.21 
Police departments across the nation are coming under scrutiny and 
participating in collaboratively calibrated and institutionally tailored 
reform.22 Close to home in Washington State, for example, the Justice 
Department recently launched an investigation to determine whether the 
Seattle Police Department has engaged in a pattern or practice of 
excessive force and racially biased policing after controversial incidents 
surfaced involving uses of force against people of color.23 The revelation 
of a Justice Department investigation spurred the Seattle Police 
Department to announce “a complete revamp of how the department 
develops professional standards and expectations” before any findings 
from the investigation and in advance of any litigation.24 Scrutiny was 
sufficient to spur self-regulation and reform without resort to 
cumbersome litigation and judicial micro-management. These shifts are 
instructive for the future of how American police will be regulated and 
the nature of remedies available for civil rights concerns. 
Formal criminal procedure jurisprudence has well-known roadblocks 
to scrutiny of the most controversial collateral consequences of policing 
such as disproportionate targeting of minorities and the use of police 
power to intimidate or harass. Landmarks of non-inquiry include Whren 
v. United States,25 which refused to invalidate pretextual stops of young 
minority men,26 and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,27 which refused to 
intervene in a case of “merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a 
police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment” in 
                                                     
legal scholarship have failed to keep up with real-world transformations that have seen law-based 
(and, in particular, court-centered) regulation become an increasingly marginal aspect of police 
regulation”). 
21. See discussion infra Part II. 
22. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS 
POLICE DEPARTMENT (Mar. 16, 2011) [hereinafter NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION] (reporting 
findings); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE PUERTO RICO POLICE 
DEPARTMENT (Sept. 5, 2011) [hereinafter PUERTO RICO INVESTIGATION] (reporting findings). 
23. Mike Carter, Justice Department to Investigate Seattle Police Civil Rights Practices, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011, at A1. 
24. Letter from Mike McGinn, Mayor, City of Seattle, to Jonathan M. Smith, Chief, Special 
Litigation Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, and Jenny Durkan, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, 
(Dec. 6, 2011). 
25. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).  
26. See id. at 813. 
27. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
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arresting a mother he had erroneously stopped before for a minor traffic 
violation in front of her frightened crying children.28 These cases are 
firmly entrenched in constitutional criminal procedure’s shifting and 
sometimes unstable terrain of rules, though vigorously decried in the 
literature.29 Courts decline to peer into the Pandora’s box of motives for 
police stratagems and exercises of power so long as an objective basis 
can be conceived for a particular police action.30 
The doctrine informs defendants who argue racial targeting or other 
problematic exercises of discretion that criminal cases are not the proper 
context to press such claims.31 Rather, the claimants must clear the 
hurdles of bringing an equal protection claim.32 The barriers to bringing 
a successful equal protection claim are prohibitively high, however.33 
                                                     
28. Id. at 323–24, 346–47, 355. 
29. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 38 (1999) (describing Whren as “formal sanction” permitting the practice of courts to “look 
the other way” when it comes to pretextual stops that disproportionately burden people of color); I. 
Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 862 (2008) (explaining that 
Whren “essentially green-lighted the police practice of singling out minorities for pretextual traffic 
stops in the hope of discovering contraband . . . [a] practice that minorities know as being penalized 
for driving while black, driving while brown . . . often fraught with intimidation, harassment, and 
disrespect”); Devon W. Carbado & Rachel F. Moran, The Story of Law and American Racial 
Consciousness: Building a Canon One Case at a Time, 76 UMKC L. REV. 851, 873–74 (2008) 
(critiquing Whren as a “license to make racial distinctions”); Richard S. Frase, What Were They 
Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 329, 331–32, 331 n.4 (2002) (collecting critiques of Atwater and noting that criticism comes 
from conservatives as well as liberals because of the substantial shield for abuse); Wayne A. Logan, 
Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte Blanche, 77 IND. L.J. 419, 465–66 
(2002); Timothy P. O’Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Probable Cause, Beyond the Fourth 
Amendment: New Strategies for Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 693, 729 (1998) 
(explaining that “messy details of discrimination are irrelevant under a regime of supposed 
objectivity”).  
30. See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 260 (2007) (explaining that the Court 
repeatedly rejected attempts to introduce subjectivity into Fourth Amendment analysis); Devenpeck 
v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153–55 (2004) (holding that objective circumstances, rather than subjective 
police motives or knowledge, control analysis of reasonableness of arrest); Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 
(“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”); 
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1978) (endorsing government’s argument that 
“[s]ubjective intent alone . . . does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional”); 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1, 235 (1973) (holding that traffic-violation arrest is 
not invalid even if was “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”). 
31. See, e.g., Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally 
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. 
Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”). 
32. Id. 
33. See Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much 
“Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1860–61 (2004) (discussing 
barriers).  
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The U.S. Supreme Court has clamped down on the availability of 
discovery for selective prosecution cases, requiring the claimant to 
“produce some evidence that similarly situated defendants of other races 
could have been prosecuted, but were not.”34 Plaintiffs thus must 
produce evidence of discrimination to have access to discovery, the main 
mechanism for finding evidence of discrimination. Moreover, courts are 
not hospitable to claimants making a case through statistical analysis, 
requiring proof of purposeful discrimination in the defendant’s case.35 
The phalanx of rules together produces a non-inquiry stance of courts in 
claims of misuse or harmful use of police discretion. 
This eschewal of inquiry is part of a larger judicial reluctance to 
second-guess police.36 Judges, particularly appellate judges reviewing 
constitutional claims, are far-removed from the streets where police must 
patrol.37 Courts are profoundly wary of hamstringing police in dealing 
with the stresses and dangers of criminal law enforcement.38 More 
fundamentally, courts are cautious because persistent problems, such as 
disproportionate minority impact, are in part a result of structural 
societal inequities and legislative choices regarding what to penalize, 
which are daunting to redress at the case and court level.39 To peer into 
                                                     
34. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468–71 (1996). 
35. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–96, 293 n.12 (1987) (requiring proof of 
purposeful discrimination in the claimant’s case and explaining that statistics failed to establish such 
proof in the defendant’s particular case); United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 356 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(construing McCleskey to signify that “[o]nly in rare cases will a statistical pattern of discriminatory 
impact conclusively demonstrate a constitutional violation”). 
36. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (reasoning that officers’ “quick 
ad hoc judgments” on matters such as arrests should not be impeded by requirements of step-by-step 
justification to be second-guessed by courts); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.15 (1968) (reasoning 
that officers “in the heat of an unfolding encounter on the street” and its dangers need intelligible 
and not overly constraining rules).  
37. As the Atwater Court put it: 
Often enough, the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of the 
moment, and the object in implementing its command of reasonableness is to draw standards 
sufficiently clear and simple to be applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-
guessing months and years after an arrest or search is made. Courts attempting to strike a 
reasonable Fourth Amendment balance thus credit the government’s side with an essential 
interest in readily administrable rules. 
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001). 
38. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984) (“In a kaleidoscopic situation such 
as the one confronting these officers . . . spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is 
necessarily the order of the day” and in such situation officers may “act out of a host of different, 
instinctive, and largely unverifiable motives . . . .”). 
39. See, e.g., MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 43, 137–40 (1999) (analyzing larger social, 
economic, and structural factors as well as implicit biases behind disproportionality in 
incarceration); Craig Haney, Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism, 
Structural Mitigation, and the Empathetic Divide, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1557, 1557 (2004) 
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differences in the experience of justice would risk—as Justice Powell 
put it for the U.S. Supreme Court—“throw[ing] into serious question the 
principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system.”40 
There is formal law and then there is practice, forged by experts, 
advocates, and officials charged with vindicating the promise of law. A 
more hopeful portrait of the prospects for improvement of the quality 
and equality of justice emerges when one examines practice. Successes 
and progress by Department of Justice investigators and by civil society 
actors such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
illuminate promising modes of redress and reform.41 
Courts are clumsy police overseers, and constitutional criminal 
procedure is awkwardly suited for the task of police regulation.42 This is 
not a reason, however, to abdicate the important task of providing a 
check and ameliorating deleterious consequences. Because of the nature 
of the constituencies most at odds with police power—marginalized 
communities—the political process often does not provide an effective 
check—at least not without a jump-start.43 What kind of remedies would 
experts fashion in cooperation with police? Recent decades have begun 
to offer an answer to this question that can inform the deliberation of 
courts, litigators, and policy makers. 
This Article analyzes the virtues of collaborative reform and remedial 
design and argues that a promising product of such collaboration is data-
                                                     
(discussing “biographical racism,” defined as “the accumulation of race-related obstacles, 
indignities and criminogenic influences that characterizes the life histories of so many African-
American capital defendants”); Research Working Grp., Task Force on Race and the Criminal 
Justice Sys., Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System, 87 WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 9–10 (2012) (discussing “structural racism”).  
40. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315–18. 
41. For a discussion of examples, see supra text and sources at notes 1–9 and infra Part II.B. 
42. For a discussion of reasons why courts are awkwardly suited to the task, see, for example, 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 786–90 (1970) (exploring the challenges surrounding the judiciary taking an 
effective supervisory or disciplinary role over police); Richard E. Myers II, Detector Dogs and 
Probable Cause, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 29–31 (2006) (analyzing the limitations of courts in 
supervising police practices and the particular challenge posed by evolving techniques of 
investigation and collecting literature); compare Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the 
Police: Individual Rights and Law Enforcement, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 19 (1988) (“In our 
constitutional mythology, the job of courts, after all, is to find law, to ascertain the rights of the 
individual, not to balance costs and benefits like a legislature, or even a construction engineer.”). 
43. See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; 
or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
1079, 1088–93 (1993) (applying public choice theory to explain the barriers to legislatures 
protecting the interests of suspects). 
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driven surveillance of police to better steer discretion. This Article dubs 
such data-driven surveillance “panopticism for police.” The Panopticon 
was envisioned by Jeremy Bentham, oft-described as one of the 
founding fathers of utilitarianism and modern deterrence theory.44 
Bentham’s original conception envisioned facilitating more efficient and 
effective governance of prison inmates by creating a structure that 
permitted the perfect visibility of prisoners arrayed around an opaque 
watchtower.45 The genius of the idea has transcended the original 
context of prison management to become a metaphor for the 
management of modern society.46 Creating a sense of “conscious and 
permanent visibility” leads to self-regulation by the populace in 
conformance with expectations because at any time one may be 
surveilled.47 
This Article explores the promising potential of panopticism for 
governing the governors—policing the police and other actors vested 
with power. While the focus of this Article is on police, the insights may 
have resonance for other criminal justice actors vested with strong 
discretion that may yield disparate distributions and experiences of 
justice. “Criminal law for cops,”48—criminal procedure’s body of 
conduct rules for police—can benefit from panoptic insights to ensure 
less costly, more internalized enforcement of civil liberties. This Article 
explores the promising potential of police panopticism as a remedy and 
governance strategy. The goal of police panopticism is to minimize the 
severe costs of managing the police by leveraging data-driven 
surveillance from multiple institutional points and actors. The state of 
                                                     
44. See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, Proportionality As a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE 
L.J. 263, 272 (2005) (“father of utilitarianism”); Michael L. Siegel, Bringing Coherence to Mens 
Rea Analysis for Securities-Related Offenses, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1563, 1569 n.46 (“father of 
deterrence theory”). 
45. Miran Božovič, Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 13–17 
(Miran Božovič ed., 1995). 
46. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200–01 
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (extending Panopticon metaphor to one of management of modern 
society); THEORIZING SURVEILLANCE: THE PANOPTICON AND BEYOND 4–8, 14–17 (David Lyon 
ed., 2006) (extending metaphor to management of modern society); Larry Catá Backer, Global 
Panopticism: States, Corporations, and the Governance Effects of Monitoring Regimes, 15 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101, 112 (2008) (tracing modern decentralized and globalized surveillance 
state); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1415–16 (2001) (tracing influence in modern governance and 
discourse). 
47. See, e.g., FOUCAULT, supra note 46, at 200–09 (analyzing influence of idea on governance of 
modern society in diverse contexts). 
48. See Steiker, supra note 10, at 2470 (calling criminal procedure “a species of substantive 
criminal law for cops”).  
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“conscious and permanent visibility” should reduce monitoring and 
remedial costs by triggering self-regulation. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the dilemma 
surrounding how much police opacity to permit in light of countervailing 
crime control and power misuse concerns and statutory routes opened to 
penetrate that opacity. This Part discusses three of the most important 
statutory routes for penetrating police opacity today: (1) 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14141, which authorizes the U.S. Department of Justice to launch 
investigations and sue police departments that have a pattern or practice 
of violating civil rights; (2) the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968 and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which deploy the 
power of the purse to require police departments receiving federal funds 
to refrain from discriminating on the basis of race, color, sex, or national 
origin; and (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which through doctrinal twists and 
turns, today better enables private parties to bring suit for violations of 
civil rights. 
Part II explores how these three key litigation routes ultimately 
constitute avenues toward collaboration and bargaining rather than 
court-ordered reform and distinguishes between institutional and law 
reform. Part II argues that the virtues of cooperation in law’s shadow 
outweigh the cost of legal stasis. This Part argues that a primary virtue is 
expert input in fashioning practicable and institutionally tailored reform 
rather than a clumsy one-size-fits-all judicial rule. Moreover, 
cooperation rather than judicial interpretation and decision-making may 
yield greater reform because courts forced to decide the merits of 
litigation and whether to impose the high costs of clumsy judicial 
remedies may end up narrowing the scope of the right rather than 
recognizing a violation. 
Part III explores the future of police regulation and reform in light of 
the insights emerging from collaborative reform and governance. This 
Article argues that police panopticism can supplement the much-eroded 
exclusionary rule by better detecting and preventing undesirable 
practices through data-driven surveillance. This Part examines emerging 
strategies for regulation by surveillance of police, including warning-
flag databases, recording of day-to-day police–citizen encounters, and 
other modes of monitoring that have emerged in consent decrees and 
memoranda of agreement. 
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I. MAIN ROUTES FOR PENETRATING POLICE OPACITY 
The question of whether and how to limit law enforcement discretion 
and penetrate the opacity of police practices has long vexed criminal 
justice experts.49 Opacity and the dangers of discretion are related 
because problematic exercises of discretion, such as the use of excessive 
force or targeting racial minorities, flourish more widely in the dark, 
when shielded from scrutiny.50 In the interest of effective crime 
prevention, the U.S. Supreme Court has been very sympathetic to the 
need to give police room to maneuver and act on educated intuition.51 
The Court tries to avoid mandating a step-by-step breakdown and 
reporting of reasons out of concern that such a requirement would overly 
hamstring effective law enforcement.52 The Court also has repeatedly 
underscored the need to avoid impairing law enforcement effectiveness 
through vigor-chilling scrutiny, which also may disclose enforcement 
policy to would-be criminals.53 
Countervailing concerns regarding the need to prevent misuses of 
power, however, have led to the development of statutory routes for 
penetrating police opacity. Congress over the years, and the courts 
                                                     
49. See generally, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY 
INQUIRY (1969); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: 
THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965); SAMUEL 
WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950–1990, 
at 21–50 (1993); James J. Fyfe, Structuring Police Discretion, in HANDLED WITH DISCRETION: 
ETHICAL ISSUES IN POLICE DECISION MAKING 183–201 (John Kleinig ed., 1996).  
50. See, e.g., David Packman, How Lack of Transparency Enables Police Brutality, THE 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/oct/25/lack-
transparency-enables-police-brutality (reporting that inaccessibility of data renders redress of police 
brutality difficult); cf. Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 914–16, 955–59 (2006) (arguing that information deficits between “insiders”—
judges, police, and prosecutors—and “outsiders”—crime victims and the general public—could be 
ameliorated through better statistical information, particularly at the local level); Anne Bowen 
Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After United 
States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1119–22 (1997) (underscoring import of 
statistical information in providing a “a rough but valuable check” against selective prosecution and 
urging Congress to mandate the assembly of records so patterns may be detected). 
51. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979) (noting police officers “have 
only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved 
in the specific circumstances they confront”); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically 
Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 911, 952–53 (1998) (analyzing important crime prevention 
interests in giving police discretion in the Terry stop context).  
52. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“A police officer’s 
determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is 
necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken 
down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search.”).  
53. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996). 
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through statutory rather than constitutional interpretation, have forged 
three main bases for penetrating police opacity and curbing discretion, 
including discretionary decisions with racial impact. One of the most 
promising developments is the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b),54 
which authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to sue for equitable and 
declaratory relief when there is a reasonable basis to believe that law 
enforcement officials have engaged in a pattern or practice of 
deprivation of constitutional or federal statutory rights.55 
Section 14141 complements earlier restrictions against law 
enforcement agencies receiving federal funds for discriminating on the 
basis of race, color, sex, or national origin under the 1968 Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3789d,56 and Title VI of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.57 Section 14141 
provides a procedural vehicle by which the Justice Department can sue 
agencies receiving federal funds for violations of constitutional or 
federal statutory rights, including the right against discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, sex, or national origin conferred by § 3789d and 
Title VI.58 The primary cause of action for private citizens and civil 
rights entities suing law enforcement, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, also has proved 
to have some teeth, despite the teething difficulties posed by doctrinal 
twists and turns.59 As demonstrated by important reforms won by private 
organizations suing under the provision, § 1983 is an important and 
complementary vehicle for extending the reach of structural reform.60 
Innovative institutional reforms secured by structural reform litigation 
include the data reporting and monitoring mandates detailed at the outset 
of this Article and further explored in Part III.61 Some scholars, however, 
                                                     
54. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210401, 
108 Stat. 1796, 2071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b) (2006)).  
55. 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b). 
56. Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 3789d (2006)). 
57. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d (2006)). 
58. See infra Part I.A–B. 
59. See infra Part I.C. 
60. For example, New York City police report the race of people targeted for investigative stops 
and promulgate written policies forbidding profiling pursuant to a stipulation won by the Center for 
Constitutional Rights to settle a civil rights suit. Stipulation of Settlement at 5, 8–9, ex. B, Daniels v. 
City of New York, No. 99 Civ. 1695 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2003); see also Al Baker, New York 
Minorities More Likely To Be Frisked, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at A1 (reporting findings 
revealed from the data collection and release that Blacks and Latinos were nine times more likely 
than Whites to be stopped by New York police in 2009).   
61. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text; infra Part III.B. 
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have expressed dissatisfaction with the quantity of cases brought and 
dismay over the persistence of police misconduct in many 
jurisdictions.62 The focus of this piece is not on the quantity debate, but 
rather on lessons for how to design regulatory strategies and remedies 
that emerge from the expert collaboration incentivized by these causes of 
action. Determining how to design more effective, finer-grained 
mechanisms of police regulation and reform is an important issue 
distinct from the general question of how to reach more departments. 
Regulatory and remedial design can inform the practices not just of 
structural reforms stemming from litigation under provisions such as 
§ 14141, § 3789d, Title VI, or § 1983, but also other avenues of police 
regulation. This Part offers an overview of the three main legal avenues 
for contemporary police department reform. The next Parts explore the 
insights that emerge from cooperative reform and offer a theory and 
practical illustrations of police panopticism as regulatory strategy and 
remedy. 
A. Path-Opening: 42 U.S.C. § 14141 
Congress launched a paradigm shift in police regulation when it 
authorized the Justice Department to investigate and sue police 
departments rather than relying just on the hope that the exclusionary 
rule and damages actions would deter rights violations.63 The legislation 
that would become 42 U.S.C. § 14141 was forged in the embers of fury 
over the videotaped beating of Black motorist Rodney King by Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers.64 The provision 
authorizing Justice Department suits was originally proposed in the 1991 
Police Accountability Act, but did not muster enough votes to pass.65 
The potent remedy regulating the police was repackaged in the police-
palatable wrapper of a bill that gave money to the police, the Violent 
                                                     
62. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of 
Public Law Litigation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 315, 365, 365 n.257 (2001) (arguing, six years after the 
enactment of § 14141, that the strategy has been ineffective in part because of filing of few suits); 
Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 20 n.72, 21 n. 73 (2009) (collecting critiques); cf. Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 
33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 100–01 (2001) (noting that high-profile cases in high-profile 
cities may draw Justice Department attention but in a world of limited resources, smaller 
communities may remain relegated to private lawsuits).  
63. See, e.g., Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder 
Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 489, 506 (2008) (discussing paradigm shift).  
64. H.R. REP. NO. 102-242, pt. 1, at 135–36 (1991). 
65. Id. at 138.  
08 - WLR March 2012 Fan Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/15/2012  12:09 PM 
2012] PANOPTICISM FOR POLICE 107 
 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.66 The Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act was mainly pitched as a bill to fight 
“ever-increasing violence” by giving police departments federal money 
to “hire new officers for community policing and to implement 
community policing programs.”67 Congress pitched the bill to the 
powerful law and order lobby as legislation aimed at giving police 
money to support their “pioneer[ing] . . . return to preventative 
community policing techniques” aimed at “working with the 
community” to “tailor[] solutions . . . to unique neighborhood crime and 
disorder problems.”68 
But buried deep in Title 21, § 210401 of the bill was the law that 
would be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141.69 To understand the history of 
the provision, one must examine its origins in the earlier criminal justice 
reform bill: the Police Accountability Act of 1991.70 The highly 
publicized Rodney King beating prompted the legislation conferring 
“standing to the United States Attorney General” to seek civil injunctive 
relief against police departments exhibiting a pattern or practice of 
violating federal civil rights.71 The House Report describing the impetus 
for the legislation recounted the controversial beating replayed on 
television screens across the nation: 
While twenty-one other officers stood by, three LAPD officers 
and a sergeant administered 56 baton blows, six kicks to the 
head and body, and two shocks from a Taser electric stun gun. 
The incident was captured on videotape by a citizen. . . . 
  Unfortunately, the Rodney King incident is not an aberration. 
The Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police 
Department, created to examine the incident . . . concluded in its 
July 1991 report that “there is a significant number of officers in 
the LAPD who repetitively use excessive force against the 
public.” . . . 
. . . . 
  . . . It is apparent, moreover, that the problem is not limited to 
Los Angeles. Police chiefs from 10 major cities convened soon 
after the King incident and emphasized that “the problem of 
                                                     
66. Pub. L. 103-322, § 210401, 108 Stat. 1796, 2071 (1994). 
67. H.R. REP. NO. 103-324, at 7–8 (1993).  
68. Id. at 7.  
69. § 210401, 108 Stat. at 2071. 
70. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-242, pt.1, at 135–39.  
71. Id. at 135. 
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excessive force in American policing is real.”72 
The Report proffered accounts from police officials and cases from 
across the country, in places such as New Jersey, Ohio, Boston, 
Michigan, and D.C.—several of which would later be locales for 
structural reform litigation73—regarding excessive force and abuse, 
particularly of minorities.74 
The conferral of investigative authority was important because prior 
to the legislation, the Justice Department lacked authority to address 
“systemic patterns or practices of police misconduct.”75 While the 
Justice Department could prosecute individual police officers, juries 
often were reluctant to convict.76 If the officer was acting pursuant to an 
official policy or was poorly trained, the Justice Department could not 
sue the police department to correct the larger problem.77 The report 
explaining the 1991 precursor legislation proffered two examples, 
including one from Washington State.78 In a nine-month period, four 
people in separate incidents were badly beaten by Mason County, 
Washington, officers in vulnerable, pain-susceptible spots such as the 
head, testicles, and kidneys after investigative stops.79 Some of the 
beaten individuals were falsely charged to induce them into signing a 
release of liability form.80 The legislative report observed that though the 
Ninth Circuit had found the training for the officers to be “woefully 
inadequate, if it can be said to have existed at all” courts were 
“powerless to correct” the larger institutional inadequacy.81 
                                                     
72. Id.  
73. See generally, e.g., Complaint, United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-5970 (MLC) (D.N.J. Dec. 
22, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/jerseycomp.php; Complaint, 
United States v. City of Steubenville (S.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 1997), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/steubencomp.php; Letter from Steven H. 
Rosenbaum, Chief, Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Subodh Chandra, Dir., Law 
Dep’t, Cleveland City Hall (July 23, 2002), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/cleveland_cover.php (investigation letter); Letter 
from William R. Yeomans, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to The Honorable Anthony Williams, Mayor of D.C. & Charles H. Ramsey, Chief of Police, 
Metro. Police Dep’t (June 13, 2001), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/dcfindings.php. 
74. H.R. REP. NO. 102-242, pt. 1, at 135–39. 
75. Id. at 137. 
76. Id. 
77. Id.  
78. Id. at 138–39. 
79. See Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1478–79 (9th Cir. 1991) (describing incidents).  
80. Id. at 1478. 
81. H.R. REP. NO. 102-242, pt. 1, at 138–39 (quoting Davis, 927 F.2d at 1482); see also supra 
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The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Los Angeles v. Lyons82 
constricted the ability of private individuals to sue for injunctive relief 
by imposing a high hurdle for establishing standing to sue for violations 
of civil rights.83 The plaintiff Adolph Lyons, a Black man, had been 
choked unconscious by the Los Angeles police during a routine traffic 
stop though he offered no resistance.84 Between 1975 and 1983, at least 
sixteen people had died during chokehold use by the Los Angeles 
police—twelve of them Black men like Lyons.85 The Court nonetheless 
held that Lyons lacked standing to sue because he could not show 
sufficient likelihood that he would again experience a chokehold by the 
Los Angeles police.86 
While the 1991 legislation’s provisions attempting to afford greater 
access to private individuals to sue for injunctive relief did not make it 
into the 1994 law, the authorization for the Department of Justice to sue 
for institutional reform did.87 The investigations or announced 
investigations across diverse jurisdictions have had “influence [that] 
greatly exceeds their number.”88 The Justice Department has authorized 
more than forty-one investigations, with additional investigations 
inaugurated this year, including an investigation into the Seattle Police 
Department.89 In fidelity with the concerns that impelled passage of 
§ 14141, the vast majority of the investigations are into allegations of 
use of excessive force.90 
                                                     
notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
82. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
83. Id. at 105–06. 
84. Id. at 97–98. 
85. Id. at 115–16 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
86. Id. at 111 (majority opinion). For an analysis of the virtual certitude standard imposed by the 
Lyons Court, see Mary D. Fan, Comment, Risk Magnified: Standing Under the Statist Lens, 112 
YALE L.J. 1633, 1635–36 (2003). 
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006) (authorizing suits by the Justice Department). 
88. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 
1387, 1420–21 (2007). 
89. See 2 BERNARD D. REAMS JR. & MICHAEL P. FORREST, USA PATRIOT ACT: A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING OF AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS 
REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT, PUBLIC LAW NO. 107-56 (2001) (Ser. 2, 
2006), Doc. 58, at 144–45 (reporting to Congress that as of 2006, the Justice Department had 
received authorization to launch forty-one investigations); Special Litigation Section Cases and 
Matters, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/findsettle.php#FindingsLetters (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2012) (collecting twenty-seven Conduct of Law Enforcement Agency Investigations 
but omitting several others). 
90. REAMS JR. & FORREST, supra note 89, Doc. 58, at 145. 
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B. Purse Power: Crime Control and Safe Streets Act and Title VI 
The Justice Department’s authority to pursue structural reform 
litigation reinforces the rights and causes of action arising from statutory 
restrictions on agencies receiving federal funds from discriminating 
based on race, color, sex or national origin.91 Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 prohibits “any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance”—including federal law enforcement and the 
numerous state and local agencies receiving federal grants—from such 
discrimination.92 Adopted four years later, the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 reiterates the prohibition and also provides 
a process of warnings, funds suspension, and suit for enforcement.93 
These two prohibitions, tied to the federal power of the purse, offer 
substantive rights and procedural avenues that are bases for limiting 
what is colloquially called racial profiling.94 
Under both statutes, the most obvious remedy for violations is 
suspension or termination of federal funding.95 The Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, for example, provides for a civil 
suit for injunctive relief, including suspension, termination, or 
repayment of funds based on a pattern or practice of violations of the 
antidiscrimination provisions.96 A very fractured U.S. Supreme Court in 
Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Commission of New York97 also 
implied a private right of action to sue for injunctive relief to enforce the 
antidiscrimination protections of Title VI.98 
The fractures in Guardians Ass’n have resulted in the dichotomy that 
proof of discriminatory intent is required to make out a damages claim 
for violation of Title VI, but discriminatory impact suffices if plaintiffs 
are seeking equitable relief to enforce Title VI’s implementing 
                                                     
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected 
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”); id. 
§ 3789d(c)(1) (similar).  
92. Id. § 2000d. 
93. See, e.g., id. § 3789d(c)(2)(A), (C) (providing for warning process and suspension of funds on 
further noncompliance). 
94. For an exposition, see, for example, Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of African-
Americans in the Selective Enforcement of Law: In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 
721, 732–38 (2004). 
95. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3789d(c)(2)(A), (C) (providing mechanism for suspension of funds).  
96. Id. § 3789d(c)(3). 
97. 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
98. See id. at 608 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring) (counting votes).  
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regulations.99 Similar to Title VI, the implementing regulation provides 
that no program receiving federal funds may: 
[U]tilize criteria or methods of administration which have the 
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of 
their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of 
defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the 
objectives of the program as respects individuals of a particular 
race, color, or national origin.100 
The distinction matters greatly. The “smoking gun” proof of 
discriminatory intent is hard to obtain.101 The most practicable way to 
make a case is through statistical evidence regarding the department’s 
practices.102 Structural reform litigants seeking to enjoin discriminatory 
practices thus have a lower hurdle of proof if they couch their suit as 
seeking to enforce the regulations implementing Title VI’s 
antidiscrimination protections. 
Private litigants have made some headway in anti-racial-profiling 
structural reform litigation brought under Title VI’s regulations.103 For 
instance, in Rodriguez v. California Department of Highway Patrol,104 
the NAACP, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), 
and the ACLU joined forces to sue for alleged racial profiling under a 
federally funded drug interdiction program called “Operation 
Pipeline.”105 In support of their Title VI claim, the plaintiffs presented 
                                                     
99. Id.; see also Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981–82 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaining dichotomy); 
David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and 
Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 330 (2001) (“Since Guardians and Choate, 
federal courts of appeals have consistently found that Title VI implementing regulations prohibiting 
practices that cause an unjustified disparate impact provide a basis for private plaintiffs to sue 
recipients of federal funds on a discriminatory effects theory, without a showing of discriminatory 
intent.”). 
100. 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2010). 
101. William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combatting Racial 
Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 44–45 (2004). 
102. Id. 
103. See, e.g., Wilson v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 66 Fed. App’x 791, 796 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(reversing motion to dismiss on defendant’s racial profiling claim involving traffic stop and 
reinstating suit, including Title VI claim); Rodriguez v. Cal. Dep’t of Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 
2d 1131, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (rejecting defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint and 
allowing suit, including Title VI claim, to proceed). 
104. 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131. 
105. Id. at 1134; see also Press Release, ACLU, California Highway Patrol Bans Consent 
Searches Following Review of Data Collection Showing Discriminatory Pattern (Apr. 22, 2001) 
[hereinafter ACLU, California Press Release], available at 
http://www.aclunc.org/news/press_releases/california_highway_patrol_bans_consent_searches_foll
owing_review_of_data_collection_showing_discriminatory_pattern.shtml (noting ACLU 
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data that Black motorists were 1.5 times as likely and Latino motorists 
were three times as likely to be stopped by California Highway Patrol 
officers than White motorists.106 District Judge Fogel ruled this disparity 
was sufficient to make a claim and survive a motion to dismiss.107 After 
clearing the procedural hurdle, the ACLU and LULAC successfully 
settled the case and levied data-generating reforms, including collection 
of data on race and traffic stops and limits on searches, as well as more 
than $800,000 in legal fees and damages.108 
Section 14141 is complementary to these prior provisions and clears 
up some of the murk in the scope of relief and reform that the Justice 
Department may seek to enforce the substantive antidiscrimination 
prohibitions of the 1964 and 1968 laws. Section 14141 authorizes the 
Justice Department to sue for a pattern or practice of violating the 
federal rights created by federal laws forbidding discrimination by a 
recipient of federal funding.109 The scope of injunctive relief authorized 
under § 14141 is more broadly worded as “appropriate equitable and 
declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.”110 Justice 
Department investigations into allegations of racially discriminatory 
impact have thus leveraged § 14141 as well as Title VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968.111 
C. A Winding and Widening Path: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
For private citizens and entities, the main vehicle for damages and 
injunctive-relief suits remains 42 U.S.C. § 1983, enacted as part of the 
                                                     
involvement). 
106. Maura Dolan & John M. Glionna, CHP Settles Lawsuit over Claims of Racial Profiling, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2003, at A1. 
107. Rodriguez, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1137; ACLU, California Press Release, supra note 105. 
108. Weatherspoon, supra note 94, at 737 n.91; Dolan & Glionna, supra note 106, at A1. 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006). 
110. Id.  
111. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States & the City of Highland 
Park, Ill. para. 3 (2000) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/Highland_MA.php (leveraging § 14141, Title VI 
and 42 U.S.C. § 3789d); Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States & the Village of 
Mt. Prospect, Ill. para. 1 (Jan. 22, 2003) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mtprospect_moa.pdf (leveraging § 14141 and 42 
U.S.C. § 3789d(c)); Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States & the City of Villa 
Rica, Ga. 1 (Dec. 23, 2003) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/villa_rica_moa.pdf (similar). 
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Civil Rights Act of 1871112 to vindicate the promise of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.113 Reconstructionist Republican legislators passed the 
legislation because of outrage and alarm over violence against Blacks in 
the South, including lynching, whippings, and other atrocities.114 While 
the legislation is also called the Ku Klux Klan Act because of its genesis 
amid rampant Klan violence, the provision was shaped by deep concern 
over the inaction and potential complicity of local law enforcement 
officials.115 The remedy of § 1983 thus was not against the Ku Klux 
Klan but rather state actors who refused to enforce state laws or enforced 
them in a discriminatory manner.116 Section 1983 provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .117 
Despite its genesis in a sense of urgent need for reform, the provision 
was interpretively disarmed by the U.S. Supreme Court and remained 
dormant for nearly a century after its passage.118 In Barney v. City of 
New York,119 Chief Justice Fuller of the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
official actions contrary to state law or policy are not under color of state 
law.120 “Lawless police brutality” thus was outside the scope of the 
statute’s tort remedy against government officials.121 Official actions in 
derogation of state law were left to the vagaries (and potential 
                                                     
112. Pub. L. No. 42-22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
113. For a history, see generally David Achtenberg, A “Milder Measure of Villainy”: The 
Unknown History of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 1999 UTAH L. 
REV. 1. 
114. Id. at 7–10. 
115. See Eric Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 229 
(1979) (detailing history). 
116. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1971), overruled by Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
118. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in 
Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 23–24 (2000) (providing history). 
119. 193 U.S. 430 (1904). 
120. Id. at 437–39 (citing Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 13 (1879)). 
121. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 213–14 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting) (so arguing based on past 
precedent). 
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recalcitrance) of state courts for redress.122 
The subsequent jurisprudence interpreting § 1983 has churned on 
whether to offer an avenue for suit and how narrow a route to provide.123 
The Court also has wavered and shifted on the liability of political 
subunits. In Monroe v. Pape,124 the Court ruled that municipalities such 
as the City of Chicago are not a “person” under § 1983 and thus are not 
subject to suit.125 In Moor v. Alameda County,126 the Court extended the 
exclusion from the interpretation of “person” to other political 
subdivisions of states, including counties.127 
The constriction by this interpretation of § 1983 meant that the 
potential remedy was ineffectual when the Warren Court began 
searching for a way to check state police misconduct. The U.S. Supreme 
Court had initially eschewed extending the controversial exclusionary 
rule to the states even though it incorporated the Fourth Amendment’s 
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures to regulate state 
and local actors.128 Without a remedy, however, it became egregiously 
apparent that state and local police were not observing the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections despite incorporation.129 State officers 
blatantly illegally seized evidence in contravention of the Fourth 
Amendment and then handed it over to federal authorities on a silver 
platter for prosecution.130 In 1961, the Court ultimately closed the gaping 
enforcement hole by extending the exclusionary remedy to the states in 
Mapp v. Ohio131 to deter state police misconduct.132 Showing how 
dormant § 1983 had become, the Mapp opinion did not even explicitly 
                                                     
122. Barney, 193 U.S. at 438 (“[I]t is for the state courts to remedy acts of state officers done 
without the authority of, or contrary to, state law.”). 
123. See, e.g., Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188–91. 
124. 365 U.S. 167.  
125. Id. 
126. 411 U.S. 693 (1973). 
127. Id. at 709–10. 
128. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28–29, 32–33 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961). 
129. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 652–53 (describing “the obvious futility of relegating the Fourth 
Amendment” to toothless remedies in the states absent incorporation of the exclusionary rule). 
130. For articles regarding the rampant violations, see, for example, J.A.C. Grant, The Tarnished 
Silver Platter: Federalism and Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence, 8 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4–13 
(1962) (discussing cases involving searches in violation of constitutional protections without 
remedy); Yale Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and 
Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083, 1101–08 (1959) (similar); Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio 
at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 321–22 (1962) (similar).  
131 367 U.S. 643. 
132.Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659–60. 
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analyze § 1983 as a remedy and mode of police regulation and 
deterrence. Writing for the Court, Justice Clark cursorily adverted to 
“the obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment [to] the 
protection of other remedies . . . .”133 
The jurisprudence interpreting § 1983 would soon shift, however, to 
give force and effect to the vehicle for seeking civil remedies for official 
misconduct. The same term as Mapp, the Warren Court began breathing 
life into § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, which held that state police officers 
acting in contravention of state law by illegally entering and ransacking 
the plaintiff’s home while he and his family were made to stand naked 
were nonetheless acting under color of state law.134 By 1971, the Court 
construed a right to sue federal law enforcement officers in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents.135 To make bringing civil suits more feasible, 
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 
1976,136 which confers on courts the discretion to award attorney’s fees 
to prevailing parties in civil rights litigation.137 In 1978, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reconstrued the term “persons” subject to suit to include 
municipalities.138 
Today, § 1983 is an important avenue for private impact litigators to 
seek reform of police practices. For example, the Center for 
Constitutional Rights sued the New York City police under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and Title VI, and was able to extract a settlement stipulation that 
required police to, among other things, record data regarding the races of 
people stopped.139 In Maryland, the NAACP and ACLU extracted a 
settlement that mandated, among other reforms, collection and 
dissemination of traffic stop and race data after suing under Title VI and 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.140 The NAACP also successfully sued New Jersey 
                                                     
133. Id. at 652. 
134.  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184–87 (1971), overruled by Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
135. 403 U.S. 388, 395–97 (1971).  
136. Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006)). 
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
138. Monell, 436 U.S at 679–82. 
139. Stipulation of Settlement at 5, 8–9, ex. B, Daniels v. City of New York, No. 99CIV1695 
(SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2003). 
140. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement at 2–4, Md. State Conferenceof NAACP Branches v. 
Md. State Police, No. 98-1098 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/racialjustice/mdnaacp_v_mdstatepolice.pdf (providing for payment 
of $300,000 to plaintiffs, hiring of consultant to ensure effective implementation of 2003 consent 
decree, and progress on disclosure of records); Md. State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Md. 
Dep’t of State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d 560, 569 (D. Md. 1999) (clearing initial standing, motion to 
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police for racial profiling of Black motorists on the New Jersey Turnpike 
under § 1983, among other causes of action.141 
Emboldened by past successes in racial profiling litigation, the ACLU 
and the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF) have filed 
suit against Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Arizona for alleged discriminatory 
profiling of Latinos in attempts to interject the state in the enforcement 
of federal immigration law.142 Private litigation under § 1983 thus can 
extend the reach and spread of structural reform. Justice Department 
suits under § 14141 and private-entity suits under § 1983 are 
complementary. As discussed in Parts II and III, these statutes have 
spurred structural reform bargaining, yielding reforms that demonstrate 
the power and potential of data-driven surveillance.143 
II. COOPERATIVE REFORM IN LAW’S SHADOW 
While § 14141, § 3789d, Title VI, and § 1983 are formal avenues of 
litigation, in practice their greatest utility is bringing expert parties 
together to bargain for reform. The causes of action induce cooperation 
through the prospect of litigation. The real action and progress, however, 
is achieved outside the courthouse. Indeed, most of the resolutions that 
have emerged from Justice Department investigations under § 14141, for 
example, were reached by negotiation before launch of a lawsuit.144 
In reality, structural reform litigation is a bit of a misnomer. In 
practice, what is occurring is structural reform bargaining that leads to 
institutional change through settlement while the law and judiciary 
remain in stasis. A distinguished cadre of writers has argued against 
settlement, particularly of civil rights litigation.145 Some of the most oft-
                                                     
dismiss, and summary judgment hurdles in earlier suit). 
141. White v. Williams, 179 F. Supp. 2d 405, 409, 413–19 (D.N.J. 2002). 
142. First Amended Complaint at 26–27, Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV 07-025 13-PHX-
MHM (D. Ariz. July 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/filedfirstamdcm071608%282%29.pdf. 
143. See infra Parts II–III. 
144.  Harmon, supra note 62, at 3–4, n.7.  
145. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076, 1083 (1984) (arguing 
settlement is distorted by imbalances in power and coerced consent akin to plea bargaining and 
short-circuits the articulation of law and public values); Samuel Issacharoff, When Substance 
Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the Rights of Vested Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent 
Decrees, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 189, 238–39 (1992) (arguing that consent decrees in public litigation 
“are inherently troublesome” because they come at the expense of legal clarification, “permit 
private parties to invoke the judiciary’s enforcement authority to define rights that are consistent 
with what the parties believe would be the litigated outcome,” and “avoid the mediating lens of the 
court and the accompanying public scrutiny”); Marshall Miller, Police Brutality, 17 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 149, 176–80 (1998) (expressing concern that “repeated consent decrees will subvert 
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expressed concerns include short-circuiting the process of articulating 
law and public values,146 lack of transparency and process in decision-
making,147 and power imbalances between parties that infect the 
bargaining process and outcomes.148 These concerns are important and 
should be taken into account in crafting settlement procedures and 
protections.149 This Part contends, however, that in the contemporary 
context of institutional and governmental litigants for reform, and in the 
shadow of increasingly police-solicitous and scrutiny-averting legal 
standards, the virtues of settlement exceed the concerns in a manner 
distinct from the past. 
A. An Invitation to Bargain 
Owen Fiss began his classic article in the anti-settlement canon 
Against Settlement with concern over how imbalance of power will 
infect the bargaining process.150 He offered as an example “a struggle 
between a member of a racial minority and a municipal police 
department over alleged brutality.”151 An assumption in the argument, 
shaped by the lingering romance of the Warren Court era, is that in the 
judicially moderated and law-governed arena of litigation, power 
distortions are ameliorated. Fiss acknowledged that power imbalances 
between party representatives persist in litigation but argued that the 
distortions are lessened “because the judge tests those statements and 
                                                     
judicial opportunities to interpret § 14141 and preempt the potential benefits of 
publicizing . . . unconstitutional police patterns and practices” and that “a high settlement 
rate . . . will largely shift the role of structuring remedial change from federal judges to the Attorney 
General and the lawyers for the defendant police departments and municipalities”); Randolph D. 
Moss, Participation and Department of Justice School Desegregation Consent Decrees, 95 YALE 
L.J. 1811, 1811–12 (1986) (expressing concern over “negotiated compromises” effacing “legal 
ideals and procedural protections”); Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by 
Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal 
Government, 40 STAN. L. REV. 203, 203–04 (1987) (expressing concern over “the risk that major 
policy decisions will be fixed in secret negotiations with small groups of private plaintiffs rather 
than through the more open and accountable procedures of ordinary executive decisionmaking”). 
146. E.g., Fiss, supra note 145, at 1076, 1083; Issacharoff, supra note 145, at 238–39; Miller, 
supra note 145, at 178; Moss, supra note 145, at 1811–12. 
147. E.g., Issacharoff, supra note 145, at 238–39; Miller, supra note 145, at 178; Rabkin & 
Devins, supra note 145, at 204. 
148. E.g., Fiss, supra note 145, at 1076. 
149. See, e.g., David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 
2620–21 (1995) (analyzing how the settlement process can be improved to better serve and address 
concerns regarding openness, legal justice, and the creation of public good).  
150. Fiss, supra note 145, at 1076.  
151. Id.  
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actions against independent procedural and substantive standards.”152 
The stance of courts, particularly in the criminal procedure context, 
has dramatically changed from the days when Fiss envisioned judicial 
decision-making and legal standards as protecting the less powerful 
minority litigant. The legal doctrine and the posture of courts has been of 
mounting deference to the police and reluctance to peer into police 
stratagems that may cause disproportionate harm to the less powerful 
who are policed.153 The strong judicial reluctance to intervene is 
reflected in the crystallization of non-inquiry rules of various types over 
the decades.154 For example, when claimants argue police have played 
foul rather than fair in various stratagems, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
taken a strong stance of non-inquiry into the subjective motivations of 
officers.155 
A landmark—and unanimously decided—example is Whren v. United 
States. The case arose from police spotting two young Black men 
driving in a disadvantaged community, or “high drug area” in police 
parlance.156 The officers executed a U-turn to tail the young Black 
motorists.157 Followed in such a pronounced manner by police, Whren 
and his companion turned right without signaling at what the officers 
deemed an “unreasonable speed.”158 Stopping the car, the officers 
walked up, and contended they saw two large plastic bags of crack 
cocaine in plain view in defendant Whren’s hands.159 
Whren argued that because driving is so extensively regulated by 
myriad open-textured provisions, such as the requirement that driving 
must be at a speed “reasonable and prudent under the conditions” or that 
the driver must give “full time and attention” to vehicle operation, police 
have wide cover to pursue a pretextual stop.160 In effect, police are able 
to target individuals for little more than being young, Black, and male.161 
                                                     
152. Id. at 1080. 
153. See discussion and sources cited supra notes 36–40 and infra notes 162–165. 
154. Id.  
155. This stance is oft-reiterated. E.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 260 (2007); 
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153–54 (2004); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 
(1996); see also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978) (endorsing government argument 
that “[s]ubjective intent alone . . . does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or 
unconstitutional”). 
156. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.  
157. Id.  
158. Id. at 808–09.  
159. Id.  
160. Id. at 809–10.  
161. See id.  
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The Whren Court refused to intervene to mitigate the risk of racial 
targeting. The Court first reiterated that constitutional criminal 
procedure—particularly Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—generally 
eschews case-specific inquiry into the subjective motivations of 
officers.162 One of the main reasons for this non-inquiry stance is 
deference to police needs and the notion that the quick ad hoc judgment 
calls officers make on the street are not susceptible to a step-by-step 
analysis.163 Whren tried to get around the rule of non-inquiry into 
subjective intent by arguing that a reasonable officer would not have 
made the stop in light of customary police practices.164 Justice Scalia, 
writing for the unanimous Court, dismissed the approach based on what 
a reasonable officer in the jurisdiction would do as even more 
unworkable than inquiry into subjective intent.165 The Whren Court 
concluded that in “the run-of-the-mine case,” there was “no realistic 
alternative” to the customary rule of deeming a search justified without 
further inquiry if officers could point to probable cause.166 Thus 
claimants who believe they were racially targeted have scant recourse 
because of the non-inquiry stance of courts in the criminal procedure 
context. Because courts are reluctant to second-guess the police, as 
Whren illustrates, it is far from clear that litigation in the judicial arena 
will ameliorate rather than aggravate imbalances in power.167 
Not only can out-of-court settlements secure potentially greater 
reform than the doctrine interpreted by courts provides, but the balance 
of power has also shifted in contemporary settlement bargaining. The 
advent of § 14141 means that the government brings its power, prestige, 
resources, and publicity to bear in representing the less powerful. The 
balance of power also has shifted, albeit in a less dramatic way, in the 
private impact litigation context, where the interests of the less powerful 
                                                     
162. Id. at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth 
Amendment analysis.”); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 260 (2007) (explaining that 
the Court repeatedly rejected attempts to introduce subjectivity into Fourth Amendment analysis); 
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153–54 (2004) (holding that objective circumstances, rather 
than subjective police motives or knowledge, control analysis of reasonableness of arrest); Scott v. 
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978) (“Subjective intent alone . . . does not make otherwise 
lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1, 235 
(1973) (holding that a traffic-violation arrest is not invalid even if it was “a mere pretext for a 
narcotics search”). 
163. E.g., Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
164. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813–14.  
165. Id. at 814–15.  
166. Id. at 819.  
167. See Fiss, supra note 145, at 1076 (giving example of a racial minority’s struggle against a 
police department’s use of excessive force). 
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are represented by prestigious, press-savvy impact litigation groups such 
as the ACLU, NAACP, and MALDEF. Leveraging the threat of negative 
spotlight, government investigators or impact litigating institutions may 
be able to exact more concessions in settlement than police-solicitous 
law would provide. 
B. On Institutional Reform Rather than Law Reform 
What about the oft-expressed concern that settlement subverts the 
clarification of law through litigation and judicial decision? Here again, 
the realities of contemporary constitutional criminal procedure doctrine 
complicate the case. When it comes to suits against the police, the 
Court’s highly deferential qualified immunity standard may lead to 
dismissal of a case without ever clarifying the law—or securing any 
institutional reform. 
The Court’s recent decision in Pearson v. Callahan168 amplifies the 
risk of dismissal without legal clarity. Pearson is a sharp shift from the 
Court’s concern for legal clarification demonstrated in Saucier v. 
Katz.169 Saucier required courts to decide if the facts alleged amount to a 
constitutional violation, even if not of “clearly established law,” because 
law would otherwise stagnate without clarification.170 Pearson 
suspended the requirement of Saucier that courts first determine whether 
the facts as pled make out a constitutional violation.171 Under Pearson, 
courts may dismiss suits on the grounds that the challenged police 
conduct did not violate clearly established pre-existing law without ever 
explaining whether the conduct was permissible.172 The elimination of 
the Saucier requirement that courts must first explain what the 
Constitution requires thus leaves both police and the public in the dark 
and prevents the crystallization of clearly established law for future 
suits. 
Moreover, when defendants try to push the law of police regulation 
these days, the law may push back. The law of criminal justice is 
retrenching sharply from its Warren Court-era hospitableness to criminal 
defendants.173 Obvious signs include the erosion and cutbacks to 
                                                     
168. 555 U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). 
169. 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), abrogated by Pearson, 129 S. Ct. 808. 
170. Id.  
171. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 816–21. 
172. Id. at 816–20. 
173. For accounts of cutbacks, see, for example, Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 
CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1525–93 (2008); Owens, supra note 18, at 565–71 (2010). 
08 - WLR March 2012 Fan Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/15/2012  12:09 PM 
2012] PANOPTICISM FOR POLICE 121 
 
landmarks of the earlier era, such as the exclusionary rule or Miranda 
protections.174 From a pragmatic perspective, clear-eyed about doctrinal 
realities and the need to achieve on-the-ground progress, pursuing 
institutional reform outside the risky judicial and doctrinal arena may net 
greater progress than aiming for legal reform. 
C. The Virtues of Collaborative Reform (Despite Legal Stasis) 
The virtue of structural reform bargaining, from a reform perspective, 
is that the resulting remedies are tailored by experts with input from 
insider police and impacted civil rights claimants. Both sides have 
incentives to bargain toward reform rather than risk judicial decision. 
The risks for civil rights claimants of generating even less hospitable law 
and the risks for police subjected to bad publicity and potentially clumsy 
judicial oversight create mutual incentive to collaborate in designing 
reforms. Judicial intervention acts as a penalty default that both parties 
have interest in avoiding. This undesirable default applies if the parties 
do not cooperate.175 The penalty default thus incentivizes cooperation.176 
In the structural reform bargaining context, the undesirable aspect of the 
penalty default from the police perspective is the risk of clumsy and 
costly court-ordered remedies in the absence of cooperation and 
settlement. The undesirable aspect of the penalty default from the civil-
rights claimant’s perspective is the danger of judicial dismissal or refusal 
to decide if a settlement is not attained. 
Transforming civil rights litigation into opening bids to bargain 
towards party-designed reforms shifts the actors designing reforms from 
the judiciary to the litigants. Rather than cause for concern, this change 
in approach may be salutary. As discussed, supra, in Part II.A, the 
litigants in police department structural reform suits are increasingly 
sophisticated actors with complementary expertise in community 
concerns and police needs. In contrast, courts are ill-suited and lack 
expertise to micro-manage police departments, particularly on the 
granular, department-tailored level needed to enhance the prospects of 
real and sustainable change. 
Federal judges are generalists. Some may have criminal law 
experience. Many, however, do not have the level of insider knowledge 
                                                     
174. See, e.g., Weisselberg, supra note 173, at 1525–93; Owens, supra note 18, at 565–71. 
175. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 90, 95, 97–100 (1989). 
176. See id. at 97–98 (explaining how penalty defaults give incentive to at least one party to 
contract around the default). 
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that investigators, police, and advocacy organizations on the ground 
possess. Not only can parties afford to be more creative than courts in 
crafting reforms, they also have the know-how to develop more effective 
modes of regulation and remedial regimes. Indeed, the incentive to avoid 
inexpert and crude judicially imposed reforms is a reason for police to 
collaborate in designing reforms by agreement, stipulation, or consent 
decree. 
Moreover, federal court decisions based on federal or constitutional 
law bind across diverse jurisdictions. In contrast, department-specific 
negotiations concerning reform can help push reforms toward best 
practices while still recognizing the need for local variation suited to 
context.177 Non-judicial actors outside the arena of one-size-fits-all 
federal and constitutional law can engage in better-adapted reforms 
without costly overbreadth or ill-fit to local context. 
Party-negotiated reforms also offer the virtues of greater flexibility 
and adaptability and room for experimentation and change if early 
solutions prove insufficient. Negotiating parties can apply the lessons of 
past agreements to explore new innovations and adaptations. Parties 
crafting agreements that need not bind other entities can afford to be 
creative in a way that courts cannot. Contrast, for example, settlement 
agreements that require implementation of an automated early-warning 
system and a statistical model to identify potentially problematic officers 
with the typical stakes of criminal procedure cases—exclusion of 
evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights if the prosecutor 
seeks to introduce the evidence in a criminal case.178 Such settlement 
agreements often have a detailed code of reforms tailored to problems 
identified after an investigation of departmental practices. This is quite a 
contrast to the simple stakes in a criminal procedure case of whether 
evidence is excluded or not.179 Courts interpreting constitutional criminal 
procedure’s minimum floor for police conduct necessarily must be 
minimalist because constitutional protections apply across cases and 
                                                     
177. Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on 
Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 818, 847 (1999). 
178. Compare, e.g., Consent Decree at para. 12, United States v. Pittsburgh, Civ. No. 97-0354 
(W.D. Pa. April 16, 1997) (requiring implementation of an early-warning system and statistical 
model for identifying problematic officers), and Consent Decree at paras. 71-77, United States v. 
Steubenville, Civ. No. 97-0966 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 1997) (requiring implementation of an 
information system that allows for regular audits with the goal of supervising officer behavior and 
preventing constitutional violations), with sources cited, supra note 17 (explaining the exclusionary 
rule is the principal remedy of constitutional criminal procedure doctrine). 
179. See supra note 178 (contrasting detailed agreements with constitutional criminal procedure’s 
remedies). 
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jurisdictions. Moreover, in a system that strongly values precedent, the 
rigid artillery of law that courts must wield to impose reform is hard to 
tweak and tailor when experience counsels change.180 
Incentivized police cooperation in designing institutional reforms and 
data production measures is desirable, in turn, because it is cheaper to 
change a cooperating entity than it is to impose clumsy top-down 
measures from a distance on a recalcitrant organization. The lessons of 
judicial intervention in famous historical contexts such as school and 
residential desegregation and prison reforms demonstrate the difficulty 
of forcing change upon recalcitrant institutions.181 Ultimately, 
sustainable change requires buy-in and transformation in the police 
organizational culture.182 As Debra Livingston, Kami Chavis Simmons, 
and others have argued, “[p]olice reform efforts are doomed to fail 
without significant cooperation of the police officers themselves.”183 
This insight has led Simmons to argue that “rank-and-file officers should 
be allowed a place at the negotiating table and should be afforded an 
opportunity to have their perspective considered during the reform 
process” because “[a]s active participants in the negotiation 
process . . . rank-and-file police officers could add value by asserting 
their interests and participating in a dialogue about creating a 
solution.”184 
Moreover, police are best-situated to access information and well-
positioned to know what reforms are needed and which strategies might 
produce the most change because of insider information gained from 
                                                     
180. Cf. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and 
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 840–70 (2004) (examining the comparative 
disadvantages of courts in regulating in areas in rapid flux, in part because of difficulties in updating 
and changing judicial interpretation of constitutional doctrine and the lag time in changes).  
181. See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 267–73 (1990) (detailing saga of 
recalcitrant city board members opposing judicial desegregation mandate and judicial coercion 
against city and legislators to implement reforms through the imposition of penalties for contempt); 
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, C01-1351 TEH, 2009 WL 
2430820, at *12–13 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (chronicling long history of state 
noncompliance with judicial orders mandating improving provision of healthcare for prisoners to 
remedy unconstitutionality of inadequate services). 
182. Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 106–09 (2011). 
183. Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the 
Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 524 
(2008); see also Livingston, supra note 177, at 848–52 (noting “a conclusion drawn by many police 
scholars—namely, that efforts at police reform will be most effective when the police organization 
itself is involved in the process and, ultimately, when reform involves not simply adherence to rules 
in the face of punitive sanctions, but a change in the organizational values and systems to which 
both managers and line officers adhere”). 
184. Simmons, supra note 183, at 524. 
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day-to-day experience. For example, officers are better situated to know 
what goes on behind the scenes, such as whether public complaints get 
buried or are investigated and how the departmental culture might 
aggravate aggressive uses of force.185 In contrast, judges are not insiders 
within police departments and typically lack experience with the daily 
workings and culture within a department.  
Though best situated to produce and share information, law 
enforcement officials have strategic incentives to withhold information 
that would better inform doctrine and judicial and public deliberation. 
The perverse incentive arises because law enforcement officials have a 
strong self-interest in withholding information regarding potentially 
problematic practices to avoid scrutiny and retain the power to engage in 
such practices even though release of the information would better serve 
collective interests in redressing problems.186 Incentivizing collaborative 
reform to avoid the penalty default of clumsy court-ordered solutions has 
the benefit of giving the police a push to cooperate in self-reform and 
deploy insider knowledge to better design regulatory and remedial 
regimes. Of course, police have self-interest—and potential law 
enforcement interests—in avoiding changes to the status quo and the 
release of internal information. Bargaining with parties representing civil 
rights concerns to avoid the costs and embarrassment of litigation, 
however, gives police better incentives to collaborate in reform and 
produce information. 
III. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF POLICE GOVERNANCE 
AND REFORM 
In a time when the exclusionary rule as the primary mode of police 
regulation is increasingly embattled,187 and the prospect of its demise 
debated,188 we particularly need expertise in fashioning alternative 
                                                     
185. See, e.g., NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION, supra note 22 (detailing, based on interviews with 
officers, how excessive use of force is aggravated by a departmental culture that condones and even 
encourages retaliation and internal practices that avoid investigating officer uses of force). 
186. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 175, at 97–100 (arguing that penalty defaults should be set 
against parties who strategically withhold information that, if shared, would increase the size of pie 
because they want bigger slice of pie). 
187. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700–02 (2009) (holding that 
costs of exclusion are too high to offer remedy for negligent police error leading to wrongful arrest 
and search); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591–94 (2006) (refusing to apply exclusionary 
remedy for knock-and-announce violation prior to entry into home). For recent commentary on the 
cutback, see, for example, Owens, supra note 18, at 565–69. 
188. See generally, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment in the 
Roberts Court, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 191 (2010) (predicting demise of, or at least substantial limits 
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models of police regulation and remedial regimes. Concern that the 
exclusionary rule makes society pay by distorting the truth-finding 
process when the constable blunders has led to cutbacks on the 
remedy.189 A majority of the contemporary U.S. Supreme Court has held 
that because of the “substantial social costs” exacted by exclusion, it 
should be the “last resort” rather than the “first impulse.”190 As the 
primary engine of police regulation and remedies for violations is 
relegated to the “last resort,” the question becomes—what should be the 
new model for police regulation and remedies for violations? 
A. The Search for Alternatives and the Potential of Regulation by 
Information 
In recent jurisprudence, the growing distaste for exclusion as a 
remedy has resulted in decisions to offer no remedy at all.191 In Herring 
v. United States,192 for example, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that 
the costs of exclusion were too high to offer the remedy for negligent 
police error that lead to an unlawful arrest and search incident to the 
arrest.193 Currently the Court is split as to whether the exclusionary rule 
remains necessary to effectuate the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment in light of the wider availability of § 1983 relief.194 In 
Herring v. United States, Justice Ginsburg in dissent, joined by Justices 
Breyer, Stevens, and Souter, underscored that she adhered to the view in 
Mapp v. Ohio that the exclusionary rule “is often the only remedy 
effective to redress a Fourth Amendment violation.”195 The makeup of 
                                                     
on, exclusionary rule); Donald Dripps, The Fourth Amendment, the Exclusionary Rule, and the 
Roberts Court: Normative and Empirical Dimensions of the Over-Deterrence Hypothesis, 85 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 209 (2010) (predicting retention of exclusionary rule or revival if discarded). 
189. Justice Cardozo framed the iconic refrain in People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 
1926). The concern has steered recent cases. See David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based 
Policing Can Reinforce—or Replace—the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 149, 190 (2009) (analyzing critique). 
190. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591. 
191. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702 (no remedy for wrongful arrest and search incident to arrest); 
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594 (no remedy for knock-and-announce violation prior to entry into home).  
192. 129 S. Ct. 695.  
193. Id. at 702. 
194. Compare Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597–98 (writing that § 1983 suits are now a more potent 
remedy than in the days when the Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states for lack of a 
viable alternative remedy to effectuate Fourth Amendment protections), with id. at 609 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that § 1983 suits remain inadequate as an alternative remedy to deter rights 
violations). 
195. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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the Court has changed since the days of Mapp, however, so that the 
more “majestic conception” of the purpose of the exclusionary rule,196 
which launched turning-point cases for police regulation such as Mapp, 
is now relegated to dissents protesting erosion of past commitments.197 
As the exclusionary rule falls out of favor with the contemporary 
Court, criminal procedure doctrine and practice has been in search of an 
alternate remedial and regulatory approach.198 The main alternatives are 
damages schemes of varying degrees of refinement.199 Constitutional 
criminal procedure doctrine, however, has shown great concern over the 
potential for damages to overdeter and chill vigorous policing because 
officers will ease up on the job rather than face individual liability.200 
Indeed, compared to the numerous criminal cases where law has been 
clarified by defendants seeking exclusion of evidence, civil cases 
presenting criminal procedure questions remain rare. Professor Donald 
Dripps has observed that only four damage actions against police have 
led to substantive Fourth Amendment decisions by the Court, laying 
aside a small cluster of cases on the execution of search warrants.201 
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Pearson v. Callahan 
does not suggest a Court hospitable to rendering damages more readily 
available any time soon. As discussed, Pearson makes it easier to 
dismiss civil rights suits against officers and harder for clearly 
established law to crystallize because courts no longer have to first 
indicate whether there has been a constitutional violation.202 In practice, 
therefore, damages will probably remain a rarely viable remedy for 
                                                     
196. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  
197. See, e.g., id. (recalling “‘a more majestic conception’ of the Fourth Amendment and its 
adjunct, the exclusionary rule” and expressing concern about its erosion (quoting Evans, 514 U.S. at 
18 (Stevens, J., dissenting))); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 763, 769–70 (1979) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (lamenting the majority’s decision declining to apply the exclusionary rule 
and neglect of the larger values served by the rule); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 356 
(1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (deploring “downgrading” of the exclusionary rule).  
198. See, e.g., Ronald J. Rychlak, Replacing the Exclusionary Rule: Fourth Amendment 
Violations As Direct Criminal Contempt, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 241, 241–42 (2010) (observing that 
now that a majority of justices have expressed dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule and interest 
in alternative means of deterrence of violations, the question is what remedial regime should be 
adopted). 
199. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 363, 364–68 (proposing a smarter monetary penalties regime). 
200. See, e.g., Jeffries, Jr. & Rutherglen, supra note 88, at 1408 (discussing judicial reluctance to 
award money damages, particularly for borderline errors, because of fears of “overdeterrence—
more precisely, unintended deterrence of legitimate acts”).  
201. Dripps, supra note 188, at 209, 235. 
202. See supra notes 168–172 and accompanying text. 
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defendants, and thus insufficient as a supplement to the eroded 
exclusionary rule. 
The search for alternatives can draw fresh insights from innovations 
outside the judicial arena. Opening up our gaze to examine approaches 
taken by experts engaging in collaborative institutional reform 
bargaining expands the model from the usual forced choice of exclusion 
or damages. This choice is forced by the constriction in the scope of 
vision of the standard palette of remedies. Analyzing the denouement 
following consent decrees can expand the field of vision to include 
panoptic data-driven surveillance approaches, such as automated early-
warning systems and audits, to prevent constitutional violations.203 
What is striking is that many of the key reforms forged by settlement 
stipulations, agreements, and consent decrees generate data to penetrate 
the opacity of police discretion through information-reporting, 
collection, and dissemination.204 Many of the reforms in cases involving 
recurrent problems such as excessive force or racial targeting call for 
police to report uses of force, demographic information, and bases for 
investigative stops and searches.205 The methods of regulation and 
remedies are shifting to information and data-driven surveillance of 
police practices. 
The benefits of data collection and dissemination for public 
deliberation and oversight concerning police tactics are demonstrated by 
the New York City Police Department’s collection of data on Terry 
stops and frisks. After mass protests erupted in New York over the fatal 
shooting of Amadou Diallou, an unarmed West African immigrant in the 
Bronx, by four police officers in 1999,206 the Center for Constitutional 
Rights sued the city for data.207 The resulting data-gathering measures 
have documented the disparate impact of Terry stops, showing, for 
example, that Black and Latino people were nine times more likely to be 
stopped than Whites in 2009.208 
Another success story crystallized in the years following the 2001 
consent decree entered into between the Justice Department and the 
LAPD.209 The reforms included such data-driven requirements as (1) the 
                                                     
203. See supra notes 1–5; infra notes 206–242. 
204. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
205. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
206. Baker, supra note 60; Jane Fritsch, Four Officers in Diallo Shooting Are Acquitted of All 
Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at A1. 
207. Baker, supra note 60. 
208. Id. 
209. Consent Decree, United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. Civil 00-11769 (C.D. Cal. June 
 
08 - WLR March 2012 Fan Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/15/2012  12:09 PM 
128 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:93 
 
completion of a written or electronic report for each incident where 
officers use force; (2) performance tracking with automated alerts for 
every officer; and (3) data-collection regarding investigative stops, 
including a suspect’s “apparent race, ethnicity, or national origin,” the 
reason for the stop, and whether a search was conducted.210 To avoid 
circumvention of data-collection efforts using “canned” or vague 
language, the reports are regularly audited.211 The LAPD case tackling a 
controversial and deeply troubled department involved heavier judicial 
intervention, including appointment of a federal monitor to ensure 
implementation.212 The reforms have paid off. A recent study found that 
since 2004 nearly every category of use of force by the LAPD dropped, 
collectively falling nearly thirty percent.213 Uses of force against Black 
and Hispanic suspects declined the most.214 The decrease in uses of force 
such as chokeholds and shootings by police is all the more striking 
because the annual number of arrests and percentage of stops resulting in 
arrest rose vigorously, suggesting that the vitality of law enforcement 
did not drain because of the reforms.215  Moreover, focus groups and 
surveys indicate increased public confidence in the police and cautious 
optimism for improved community relations that extended across racial 
and ethnic groups.216 
Settlement agreements have pried information from police to 
penetrate the opacity that shields potential abuse, which has begun an 
information cascade when it comes to persistent flashpoints such as 
racial profiling. Successfully securing reform through investigation in 
one jurisdiction may lead to reforms in other jurisdictions without even 
need for suit—leading by example and general deterrence. Many states 
have introduced racial profiling legislation, often requiring data 
                                                     
15, 2001). 
210. Id. at paras. 55–69, 104–05. 
211. Id. at para. 128. 
212. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER STONE ET AL., HARVARD KENNEDY SCH., POLICING LOS ANGELES 
UNDER A CONSENT DECREE: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD 2–5 (May 2009),  
available at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs/programs/cri
minal-justice/Harvard_LAPD_Report.pdf. 
213. Id. at 33. 
214. Id. at 34. 
215. Id. at 25, 33, 35; id. at 19 (Officers interviewed expressed worries about de-policing and 
policing being less proactive in tasks like investigation and arrests because of paperwork burdens 
and fear of disciplinary action). While subjective accounts are worth considering, the objective 
measurement of arrests and percentage of stops resulting in arrests suggests caution may not be a 
bad thing for accuracy. 
216. Id. at 2, 44–53. 
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collection.217 Some police departments even have begun voluntarily 
collecting data on the issue after successful suits in other jurisdictions—
showing the power of cascades of reform.218 Data-generation remedies 
also can help illuminate the impact of implicit biases that can lead to 
persistent problems such as disproportionate impact in criminal justice 
policies and racial targeting because of subconscious perceptional 
distortions, which would otherwise be obscured by opacity.219 
Monitoring through data generation exerts its own control function. 
The greater transparency produced by data generation is a technique of 
police panopticism.220 When police are subject to the watchful gaze of 
courts, the public, and self-surveillance, they behave in better conformity 
with expectations.221 Data-driven surveillance also can spur self-
examination and change. Minneapolis–St. Paul police, for example, 
adopted a policy of advising motorists of their right to decline consent to 
a search and set up complaint collection centers after data gathering 
revealed the disparate impact of stops and searches on minority 
motorists.222 In the St. Paul case, the legislature was the entity creatively 
providing incentive to undertake data-driven surveillance by offering 
                                                     
217. Michael E. Buerger & Amy Farrell, The Evidence of Racial Profiling: Interpreting 
Documented and Unofficial Sources, 5 POLICE Q. 272, 273–74 (2002). 
218. Id. at 273. 
219. For some of the abundant and rich literature on implicit biases, see generally, for example, 
Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA 
L. REV. 1241; Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate 
Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314 (2002); Jennifer L. 
Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 876 (2004); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Targets of Discrimination: Effects of Race on 
Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 399 (2003); Scott W. Howe, 
The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the Eighth Amendment Argument for 
Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2083 (2004); 
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988); 
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005); Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic 
Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471 (2008); Rory K. Little, What Federal Prosecutors Really 
Think: The Puzzle of Statistical Race Disparity Versus Specific Guilt, and the Specter of Timothy 
McVeigh, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1591 (2004); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor’s 
Perspective: Race of the Discretionary Actors, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1811 (1998); L. Song 
Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 235 (2011), Yoav 
Sapir, Neither Intent nor Impact: A Critique of the Racially Based Selective Prosecution 
Jurisprudence and a Reform Proposal, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 127 (2003). 
220. See FOUCAULT, supra note 46, at 201–02 (developing, as a metaphor for control, the notion 
of panoptic prison in which prisoners arrayed in transparent cells self-police).  
221. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text for applying panoptic insights to policing. 
222. Heron Marquez Estrada, Focus of Profiling Shifts from St. Paul: Minneapolis Officials Say 
They’ll Soon Reveal New Plans for Traffic Stops and Searches, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., June 22, 
2001, at A1; David Shaffer & Heron Marquez Estrada, St. Paul Police Search Black, Hispanic 
Drivers at Higher Rate, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Jan. 10, 2001, at A1. 
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money for video cameras in police cars if agencies agreed to gather 
data.223 Thus, legislatures as well as civil rights litigators can be catalysts 
for creatively and cooperatively triggering data-driven methods to 
prevent undesirable conduct. 
B. Optimizing Police Panopticism 
The lessons of experience from implementing consent decrees can 
inform better design to optimize the strategy of police panopticism. An 
important lesson of experience is that generalized data-gathering 
regarding problems such as racial disparities is not enough to steer 
behavior without finer-grained surveillance. There is a difference 
between data-driven surveillance of police conduct and amassing more 
data of disparities. We have ample data and recurrent reports of 
disparities in criminal justice at the national, state, and local levels.224 
What we need is smarter surveillance of the conduct that can lead to 
problems such as disparities in who is targeted for investigative stops 
and seizures or the use of excessive force. 
Effective data-driven surveillance calls for finer-grained information 
regarding specific actor conduct. Finer-grained data-generation 
surveillance better responds to the frequent lament that the “low 
visibility” of line-level law enforcement officers renders effective 
oversight difficult.225 Indeed, the lessons of implementing effective 
reform following earlier consent decrees show the need for such finer-
grained data. An example is the NAACP and ACLU’s pioneering 
litigation over racial profiling in Maryland in the 1990s, which resulted 
in an earlier form of consent decree. 226  The consent decree involved an 
agreement that police collect data on the race of people stopped and 
                                                     
223. Shaffer & Estrada, supra note 222, at A1.  
224. See generally, e.g., MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE RATES OF 
INCARCERATION BY RACE AND ETHNICITY (2007) (presenting disparity data across jurisdictions); 
Research Working Grp., Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice Sys., supra note 39 
(summarizing data on racial disparities in Washington state); ROBERT D. CRUTCHFIELD ET AL., 
WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM’N, A STUDY ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN 
THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL CASES IN KING COUNTY WASHINGTON: FINAL REPORT (1995) 
(presenting findings on disparities in Washington State). 
225. Livingston, supra note 177, at 820; cf. Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the 
Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 552 
(1960) (discussing low-visibility police decisions not to invoke criminal process). 
226. See Press Release, ACLU, Maryland Court Orders State Police to Turn Over Racial 
Profiling Records (Feb. 10, 2011) [hereinafter ACLU, Maryland Press Release], available at 
http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/maryland-court-orders-state-police-turn-over-racial-profiling-
records (describing settlement). 
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searched in traffic incidents, make the process of filing complaints more 
user-friendly, and implement better measures to investigate 
complaints.227 The measures were adopted to redress “an alleged pattern 
of racially discriminatory stops, detentions and searches of minority 
motorists traveling on I-95 in the state of Maryland.”228 
Five years after these reforms, data in 2008 showed similar disparities 
in searches of minority motorists compared to White motorists as in 
2002, the year immediately preceding entry into the consent decree and 
implementation of its reforms.229 By 2008, litigators had the insights of 
experience to draw upon in seeking more effective information-based 
regulation and remedies. NAACP and ACLU litigators went back to 
court and sued for finer-grained information to effectuate enforcement of 
the agreement.230 In 2010, the organizations successfully secured a court 
order requiring release of approximately ten thousand documents 
pertaining to racial profiling complaints against officers that the 
Maryland Department of Police had tried to shield against release as 
personnel records.231 
Of course, in the information age, we have smarter ways of data-
based surveillance than sorting through boxes of ten thousand 
documents. The evolution in the nature of collaboratively designed 
reform over the years of experience with structural reform bargaining 
have yielded examples of how to better regulate police through smarter 
data-driven surveillance. Examples of reform by surveillance range from 
important low-technology changes, such as collecting information on 
people stopped, to sophisticated computerized systems for analyzing 
complaints data and potential red-flag patterns.232 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the greatest advances in the nature of reforms 
designed have occurred in settlements extracted by leveraging the 
power, authority, and prestige of the Justice Department under 
§ 14141.233 John C. Jeffries, Jr., and Scott Rutherglen have aptly argued 
                                                     
227. See id. 
228. See, e.g., Md. State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Md. Dep’t of State Police, 72 F. 
Supp. 2d 560, 563–64 (D. Md. 1999) (describing what the suit is based on).  
229. ACLU, Maryland Press Release, supra note 226. 
230. Md. Dep’t of State Police v. Md. State Conference of NAACP Branches, 988 A.2d 1075, 
1078 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010). 
231. Id. 
232. See infra notes 238–242 and accompanying text. 
233. For example, Pittsburgh police must file a written report after each traffic stop that records 
the race of people stopped, whether the stop escalated to a search, and whether searches yielded any 
contraband or other evidence pursuant to a consent decree. Consent Decree at paras. 16-17, United 
States v. Pittsburgh, Case No. Civil 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2002). 
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that one of the great virtues of Justice Department-initiated structural 
reform is the “political endorsement of the need for structural relief” and 
the accountability of government officials.234 
Another important virtue of Justice Department structural reform 
bargaining is the greater equalization in bargaining power when the 
Justice Department represents the community. Smarter and farther-
reaching reforms are more readily exacted by the Justice Department 
than by private litigants, including even well-organized groups such as 
the ACLU and NAACP. Contrast, for example, the lengths of litigation 
the NAACP and ACLU had to pursue to obtain racial profiling 
complaints from the Maryland State Police with the readiness and ease 
with which the Justice Department recently extracted sensitive records 
from the Maricopa County, Arizona, Sheriff’s Department.235 
In September 2010, the Justice Department filed a complaint against 
the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office concerning allegations of a pattern 
or practice of national origin discrimination and unconstitutional 
searches and seizures.236 Maricopa County opted to settle soon after the 
filing of the complaint to remove the case to the inactive docket and to 
stay the proceedings.237 As the price for staying the civil rights lawsuit 
pursuant to the 2011 consent decree, the Justice Department exacted 
from Maricopa County agreements to: 
 Release all use of force forms completed and submitted by 
sheriff’s deputies between September 2008 and March 2009; 
 Release all documents related to internal affairs investigations 
concerning allegations of excessive use of force and/or 
discriminatory policing from 2008 onwards; and 
 Disclose all current or former personnel recommended for 
                                                     
234. Jeffries, Jr. & Rutherglen, supra note 88, at 1421. They argue: 
An action brought by federal officials represents a political endorsement of the need for 
structural relief, usually to remedy pervasive constitutional violations. Furthermore, when the 
litigation is settled, it serves as an acceptable form of bargaining between governments, outside 
the ordinary political processes of revenue sharing and legislation but still under political 
control. . . . Unlike court orders obtained by private plaintiffs, those obtained by federal 
officials involve some degree of political accountability in the decision to sue and to seek 
structural relief. The democratic deficit is rapidly resolved when the real attorney general, not a 
private attorney general, decides to sue. 
Id. 
235. See supra notes 227–231. 
236. Complaint at 6, 9, United States v. Maricopa County, Ariz., No. 2:10-cv-01878-GMS (D. 
Ariz. Sept. 2, 2010); see also Letter from Loretta King to Sheriff Joseph Arpaio, supra note 7 
(conveying allegations). 
237. See Joint Motion to Remove Case to the Inactive Docket and Stay Proceedings, United 
States v. Maricopa Cnty., Ariz., No. 2:10-cv-01878-GMS (D. Ariz. June 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/findsettle.php#FindingsLetters. 
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correction, discipline, suspension, or termination because of 
excessive use of force and/or discriminatory policing from 
January 1, 2007 onwards.238 
Examining Justice Department consent decrees yields other examples 
of innovations in refined data-driven surveillance that afford finer-
grained and more effective monitoring than mere data collection. For 
example, the Justice Department’s 2009 consent decree with the U.S. 
Virgin Islands Police Department (VIPD) requires the development and 
implementation of a risk management system to collect and record: 
a. all uses of force; 
b. canine bite ratios; 
c. the number of canisters of chemical spray used by officers; 
d. all injuries to prisoners; 
e. all instances in which force is used and a subject is charged 
with “resisting arrest,” “assault on a police officer,” “disorderly 
conduct,” or “obstruction of official business;” 
f. all critical firearm discharges, both on-duty and off-duty; 
g. all complaints (and their dispositions); 
h. all criminal proceedings initiated, as well as all civil or 
administrative claims filed with, and all civil lawsuits served 
upon, the Territory and its officers, or agents, resulting from 
VIPD operations or the actions of VIPD personnel; 
i. all vehicle pursuits; 
j. all incidents involving the pointing of a firearm (if any such 
reporting is required); and 
k. all disciplinary actions taken against officers.239 
The database permits individualized surveillance, requiring the name, 
badge number, shift, and supervisor of each involved officer.240 The 
VIPD is required to design a protocol for the automated system 
permitting data analysis according to the: 
i) number of incidents for each data category by individual 
officer and by all officers in a unit; ii) average level of activity 
for each data category by individual officer and by all officers in 
a unit; and iii) identification of patterns of activity for each data 
category by individual officer and by all officers in a unit.241 
                                                     
238. Agreement at 6, United States v. Maricopa County, Ariz., No. 2:10-cv-01878-GMS (D. 
Ariz. June 2, 2011). 
239. Consent Decree at para. 60, United States v. Virgin Islands, No. 03-23-09 (D.V.I. Mar. 23, 
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/VIPD_CD_03-23-09.pdf.  
240. Id. at para. 61. 
241. Id. at para. 64. 
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The consent decree also requires quarterly review of information 
generated by the automated risk management system.242 
Developments in data-driven surveillance thus have moved us beyond 
the aphorism that mere information is power. Today, the automation of 
information and data-driven surveillance is power. Some of the most 
promising reforms to emerge from collaborative structural reform 
bargaining harness this insight. The examples detailed above 
demonstrate how reforms from structural reform bargaining do not only 
generate information, but also use the information to steer behavior and 
change organizational culture through, for example, early warning 
systems and intervention protocols. 
The reforms framed in consent decrees and memoranda of agreement 
are not just empty promises—they are leading to changes in practices 
and spurring cascades of reform.243 Consent decrees are not merely 
promissory—they are entered as court orders and provide for judicial 
enforcement in the event of nonperformance by the police department.244 
While memoranda of agreement are less formal than consent decrees and 
do not take the form of a court order, these agreements typically also 
provide for enforcement in federal court.245 Moreover, a Justice 
Department announcement regarding the commencement of 
investigation against a police department can spur voluntary reform even 
in advance of any findings, as recently demonstrated in Seattle.246 
Eight months after the Justice Department announced an investigation 
into allegations of excessive force and racially biased policing by the 
Seattle Police Department, Seattle Mayor Mike McGinn announced “a 
complete revamp of how the department develops professional standards 
and expectations.”247 Contemplated reforms include such measures as in-
                                                     
242. Id. at para. 64. 
243. See, e.g., Buerger & Farrell, supra note 217, at 273–74 (summarizing reforms). 
244. See, e.g., Consent Decree at paras. 104–05, United States v. Los Angeles, No. Civil 00-
11769 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001); Consent Decree at paras. 29, 32, 36–37, United States v. New 
Jersey, Case No. Civil 99-5970 (MLC) (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1999). 
245. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States & the City of Villa Rica, 
Ga. 7 para. 4 (Dec. 23, 2003) (“This Agreement is enforceable through specific performance in 
Federal Court.”); Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States & the Village of Mt. 
Prospect, Ill. 9 para. 43 (Jan. 22, 2003) (“This Agreement is enforceable through an action for 
specific performance in federal court.”). 
246. Steve Miletich, Seattle Police Plan Major Changes in Oversight of Use of Force, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2011), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2016950243_doj07m.html 
(discussing reforms Seattle Police Department is pursuing after announcement of Justice 
Department investigation into a potential pattern and practice of excessive force). 
247. Id.; Letter from Mike McGinn, Mayor of Seattle, to Jonathan M. Smith, Chief, Special Litig. 
Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, and Jenny Durkan, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Wash., 
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car video review in use-of-force investigations; creation of a Force 
Review Board and Force Investigative Team; a “top-to-bottom review 
and rewrite” of the Department’s policies and procedures; and creation 
of a new Professional Standards Section responsible for internal audits, 
inspections, and researching best practices.248 Reform spurred by 
structural reform bargaining in one jurisdiction also can lead other police 
departments to voluntarily undertake improvements to avert the scrutiny 
and expense of litigation—extending the power and sweep of self-
regulation.249 Thus, the panoptic power is so efficient that even the threat 
of scrutiny can spur police department self-regulation. 
There are different ways to define and measure impact and success 
when it comes to institutional reform of police practices. One way to 
measure impact is progress in the perception, documentation, and 
revelation of problems previously misunderstood or discounted. For 
example, reforms requiring reporting of the race of people stopped and 
searched have revealed that not only are minorities disproportionately 
stopped and searched, but also that stops and searches of minorities yield 
lower “hit rates” of evidence or arrests.250 Because of this data, 
disproportionate targeting can no longer be dismissed as vague 
unsubstantiated allegations or justified because of supposed greater 
probability of criminality.  Data collection has revealed that searches of 
minorities are less efficient and yet police suspicion leads to grossly 
disproportionate targeting of minorities for stops and searches.251 Thus, 
data-driven surveillance may detect patterns revealing potential implicit 
bias because of subconscious inaccurate stereotyping.252 
Of course, the ultimate goal and standard of success is reduction of 
practices of persistent concern, such as reduction of the disproportionate 
targeting of minorities yielding lower hit rates or excessive force. More 
studies must be done about the impact of data-driven surveillance on 
reducing such problems. The focus should be on the newer generation of 
                                                     
Re: United States’ Investigation of the Seattle Police Department – Garrity Protections (Dec. 6, 
2011) [hereinafter Letter from Mayor McGinn]. 
248. Id. at 1–2. 
249. Buerger & Farrell, supra note 217, at 273. 
250. See, e.g., Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s 
“Stop and Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813, 815–
17, 820–21 (2007) (collecting and analyzing data). 
251. Id; see also Baker, supra note 60 (reporting findings revealed from the data collection and 
release that Blacks and Latinos are nine times more likely than Whites to be stopped by police in 
2009). 
252. See supra note 219 for some of the abundant and rich literature on implicit bias in policing 
and other legal contexts involving judgment and decision making. 
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smarter reforms that involve not just collection of data in the aggregate, 
but also methods of monitoring and red-flag systems that create greater 
incentive for individual officers to self-regulate and internalize the 
external gaze facilitated by data-driven transparency. 
CONCLUSION 
Structural reform bargaining arising from police practice reform suits 
is offering a micro-laboratory for experimentation with smarter methods 
of police regulation and remedial regimes. The insights that are 
emerging from collaborative agreements demonstrate the power of a 
third alternative to the traditional exclusionary rule–damages dichotomy 
for deterring police misconduct. The potential third approach to 
preventing undesirable police conduct is information-based regulation 
that leverages data-driven surveillance of police practices. Such data-
driven surveillance increasingly entails more than mere data collection 
and reporting. Rather, the most powerful reforms harness data to detect 
potentially problematic actors who harm the reputation of the whole 
department and to prevent future abuses.  
A minority of officers can account for a substantial amount of 
problematic conduct, tarring trust in a majority of hard-working officers. 
For example, one of the most recently released investigative findings, 
focusing on excessive force by the Seattle Police Department, noted that: 
In any given year, a minority of officers account for a 
disproportionate amount of use of force incidences. Over the 
more than two-year period reviewed, 11 officers used force 15 
or more times, and 31 officers used force 10 or more times. In 
2010, just 20 officers accounted for 18% of all force incidents. 
Yet, [the Seattle Police Department] has no effective 
supervisory techniques to better analyze why these officers use 
force more than other officers, whether their uses of force are 
necessary, or whether any of these officers would benefit from 
additional use of force training.253 
If not caught and corrected, problematic practices may become 
structurally entrenched, infecting a department’s institutional culture and 
undermining community trust.254 
                                                     
253. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, W. DIST. OF 
WASH., INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT 4 (Dec. 16, 2011) [hereinafter 
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE]. 
254. See, e.g., NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION, supra note 22, at V (finding that “too many 
officers of every rank either do not understand or choose to ignore the boundaries of constitutional 
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The finding that the Seattle Police Department has engaged in 
excessive force is a sobering reminder that even police agencies such as 
the Seattle police, hailed as innovative and responsive to community 
concerns,255 must wrestle with problematic conduct. Moreover, the 
Seattle Police Department’s case illustrates the import of collaborative 
design and definition of desirable conduct with input from a powerful, 
expert entity representing countervailing civil rights concerns, such as 
the Justice Department. Indeed, even before the Justice Department 
investigation, the Seattle Police Department already had an Early 
Intervention System—admirable self-monitoring in principle.256 As the 
Justice Department found, however, the Seattle police thresholds for 
triggering red flags are far too high, interventions come far too late, and 
supervisory review “is superficial at best.”257 Effective reform and 
design of data-driven police surveillance is better produced in the 
crucible of adversarial collaboration—that is, bargaining between 
entities representing countervailing interests. 
Data-driven surveillance measures such as implementing automated 
early detection systems and requiring audits and supervisory review also 
changes the structural context of neglect that often is identified as a 
contributing factor to abuses.258 Sophisticated systems for preventing 
abuses by discerning red-flag patterns of behavior have the potential for 
greater impact in penetrating the opacity of police practices where 
potential abuses may flourish. The monitoring for problematic patterns 
of behavior also incentivizes internalization of expectations of proper 
behavior because deviation is subject to detection through data-driven 
surveillance. Such surveillance is more effective if designed and 
conducted from multiple vantages with input from groups representing 
                                                     
policing” and structurally and culturally entrenched problems with the department that “undermine 
trust within the very communities whose cooperation the Department most needs”). 
255. See, e.g., ACLU, Innovative LEAD Project Sends Drug Offenders to Services Instead of Jail 
(Oct. 13, 2011), available at http://www.aclu-wa.org/news/innovative-lead-project-sends-drug-
offenders-services-instead-jail (detailing leadership of Seattle Police in responding to community 
input and implementing innovative program).  
256. INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE, supra note 253, at 22. 
257. Id. at 23. For example, a red flag is not triggered and departmental intervention does not 
occur unless there are seven uses of force in a period of six months or fourteen uses of force in a 
year. Id. at 22.  
258. See, e.g., id. at 5, 15, 18 (finding that lack of supervisory analysis of uses of force, 
“appalling[ly]” low-quality investigations of citizen complaints, and nonreporting of uses of force 
by officers contributes to the problem of excessive force); PUERTO RICO INVESTIGATION, supra note 
22, at 32 (finding that “[l]ack of reporting requirements and objective supervisory review” and 
“[i]nadequate systems to review critical incidents” as well as “[c]ondoned fear and violence by 
tactical units” contribute to longstanding problems with excessive force). 
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countervailing civil liberties concerns as well as expert insider police. 
Statutory avenues such as § 14141, Title VI, § 3789d, and § 1983 have 
become more viable avenues to penetrate police opacity and introduce 
data-driven surveillance. Designing a panopticon for police is an 
ambitious project with important implications that call for collaboration 
across institutions—including formal adversaries. Nonjudicial 
institutions outside the constraints of formal constitutional criminal 
procedure doctrine have important expertise to offer in the design of the 
future of police regulation and remedies for social harms. 
 
